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Corporate law theory and practice considers shareholder relations with
companies and the implications of ownership separated from control. Yet
through the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) bailout and the
government's resultant shareholding, ownership and control at many
companies have merged, leaving corporate theory and practice for the
financial and automotive sectors in chaos. The government's $700 billion
bailout is a unique historical event; not merely because of its size, but also
because of a resulting ripple through corporate scholarship and practice.
This Article builds on the Author's five testimonies before Congress during the
financial crisis and implementation of the TARP bailout and his consultation
for the Special Inspector General for TARP. It updates the six central theories
of corporate law to reveal that none function adequately when considered
with a controlling government shareholder that enjoys sovereign immunity
from corporate and securities law. From agency theory and nexus-of-
contracts thought to the shareholder/director primacy debate, even to
notions of progressive corporate law, existing theory breaks down when a
government shareholder is present. After considering corporate theory, the
Article offers predictions for how the Treasury Department's stock ownership
reshapes the practice of corporate law. In short, TARP will result in a tectonic
shift for current understanding about insider trading, securities class actions,
share voting, and state corporate law fiduciary duties. The Article closes with
three recommendations. First, that the Treasury take frozen options, an
invention explained in the text, rather than equity. Second, that Congress pass
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legislation establishing a fiduciary duty for the Treasury to maximize the
value of its investment, a suggestion that has informed language drafted in
legislation introduced by Senator Mark Warner and Senator Bob Corker. And
finally, that the Treasury adopt a sales plan for closing out its TARP holdings.
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The good and efficient working of a board of Bank Directors depends on its
internal harmony.... In France the difficulty... has been met
characteristically. The Bank of France keeps the money of the State, and the
State appoints its Governor. The French have generally a logical reason to give
for all they do, though perhaps the results of their actions are not always so
good as the reasons for them. The [Governor] has not always, I am told, been a
very competent person.
Walter Bagehot, first Editor-in-Chief of The Economist,
18731
Introduction
The theory and practice of corporate and securities law in the United
States is a carefully constructed tapestry, woven through the time span of
the American experience. Over that time, the expectations of investors,
managers, and regulators have enjoyed a dance of slow experimentation
toward a steady and predictable evolution. The thesis of this Article is that
when the Treasury Department ("Treasury") and the Federal Reserve
("Fed"), through the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) bailout, took
equity positions in over six hundred of the nation's banks, as well as in the
American International Group (AIG), Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, GM,
Chrysler, and GMAC, they introduced an entirely alien variable to this finely
woven tapestry.
There are two foundations underlying this observation. First, the
Treasury and the Fed are generally controlling shareholders, even in spite
of their relatively low minority interest in particular companies. Second,
they are controlling shareholders that also enjoy sovereign immunity from
federal securities law and state corporation law. The presence of a control
shareholder in publicly traded corporations is relatively infrequent. The
presence of a control shareholder in publicly traded companies that also
enjoys sovereign immunity from corporate and securities law is entirely
novel. As a result of this perfect storm, a thorough investigation of the
implications of the government's ownership via TARP reveals a number of
uniquely unforeseen consequences to the theory and practice of corporate
and securities law.
To emphasize the unique nature of the Treasury's ownership through
TARP, this Article will begin by briefly considering the history of the United
States government's entanglement in private business. Though the federal
government has frequently chartered businesses that were wholly owned
by the United States, particularly during the Second World War, and
1 WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET: A DESCRIPTION OF THE MONEY MARKET 216-17 (14th ed.
John Murray 1931) (1873).
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occasionally exercised power over publicly traded businesses through
special provisions in their charters, as in the case of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, the United States government has never taken a controlling
interest in a publicly traded company chartered under state law. As such,
the government's ownership in businesses through TARP is a circumstance
without precedent.
The emphasis of this Article is the revolutionary problems for
corporate law theory and practice posed by the presence of a controlling
shareholder that also enjoys sovereign immunity. Therefore, before
rethinking those theoretical and practical elements, this Article will wade
into these unexplored depths to consider the two threshold questions in
the analysis. First, is the government really a controlling shareholder? And
second, do the Treasury and Federal Reserve actually enjoy sovereign
immunity from corporate and securities law?
One answer this Article proposes is that the government is likely a
control shareholder for the largest TARP recipients in which it holds an
interest, including Citigroup ("Citi"), AIG, GM, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac,
and, with some significant measure of certainty, the nine remaining banks
from among the top nineteen banks to originally receive TARP funding.
This Article then offers the suggestion that the government might, with a
steadily decreasing degree of certainty based on degree of government
ownership, also be considered a control shareholder for many of the other
six hundred banks accepting TARP funding.
This Article then considers the application of sovereign immunity to
the Treasury and Federal Reserve's exercise of ownership in TARP
companies under the bailout, and suggests a number of novel theories
under which a clever plaintiffs lawyer might try to challenge the federal
government's sovereign immunity. It ultimately arrives at the conclusion
that the federal government's belt-and-suspenders approach protecting it
from liability in this arena, including the liability waivers of the Emergency
Economic Stability Act (EESA), 2 waivers included in the Securities
Exchange Act (the "'34 Act" or the "Exchange Act"), and challenges to using
other avenues, eventually forecloses meaningful challenge to the federal
government's sovereign immunity in its exercise of ownership power over
its TARP shares.
Thus, the first prong of this Article's thesis is that the theoretical
underpinnings of American corporate law are completely unprepared for
the presence of a control shareholder with sovereign immunity. This is a
fairly unique outcome. Corporate law theory is home to essentially six
distinct, and at times vigorously opposed, schools of thought that do battle
in the arena of corporate theory. First, this Article looks to the foundations
2 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, div. A, 122 Stat
3765 (to be codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
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of corporate law in agency theory and nexus-of-contracts theory. In both
contexts, it considers the effects of a control shareholder with sovereign
immunity. Then, it considers the Cain and Abel-like warring children of the
agency and nexus-of-contracts marriage: shareholder primacy and director
primacy. Shareholder primacy is a difficult fit, as it contemplates a non-
conflicted shareholder electorate that minimizes the special interest
director problem, a washboard which TARP ownership obviously
complicates. Director primacy is an easy critic of TARP ownership, as it is
inherently hostile to the accretion of shareholder power, and yet is difficult
to understand in light of elected directors who may be beholden to
government shareholders.
The team production model of corporate law is also considered in this
Article, with the result that the model's reliance on the board of directors
as a mediating hierarch, balancing the interests of varying stakeholders, is
complicated by the political pressures placed on the government
shareholder hierarch in this situation. The progressive corporate law
model of corporate law is also considered in light of this dynamic, with the
result that the accountability of government regulators and the disclosure
rules underlying progressive corporate law are threatened by the presence
of government ownership.
In the final analysis, this Article considers each of the central theories
of corporate law in turn, and in depth, with updated analysis that considers
the presence of an immune control shareholder, and arrives at the
conclusion that none of these central corporate law theories supports, or
even properly describes, the propriety or effect of a controlling
shareholder that at once enjoys sovereign immunity and regulates the
businesses in which it holds an interest.
Near the close of the inquiry, this Article then enters the second prong
of its thesis by offering some analysis for practitioners of corporate and
securities law with a warning about the effect of the Treasury as a
shareholder. In short order, it warns that 1) the Treasury has free reign to
engage in insider trading of its shares, 2) the Treasury is the only control
shareholder that evades fiduciary duties to other shareholders under
corporate law, 3) the Treasury may end up serving as a lead plaintiff in
private securities class action litigation against the very companies it is
trying to support through TARP, 4) sales of unregistered securities of any
TARP recipient held by another TARP recipient may be considered
affiliated sales, which means they might be voidable at the option of any
shareholder that purchases them, 5) the ability of boards of directors to
approve conflicted transactions, which hinges on their independence under
state corporate law, may be endangered, and 6) the government will obtain
the right to nominate candidates for the boards of publicly traded
companies, and vote for other shareholders' nominees, under a pending
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rule from both the SEC and the Congress designed to facilitate shareholder
access to the corporate ballot.
In concluding, the Article offers a touch of hope to the concerned
corporate law traditionalist in the form of three unique reform suggestions.
First, it recommends that the government eschew its voting common
equity, and even its non-voting preferred shares, in favor of frozen options.
Those options would be designed such that the government would never
be permitted to exercise them, and accordingly never be permitted to
exercise the voting or other rights that accompany either common or
preferred shares. The government, however, would be permitted to sell
them into the market and allow other non-governmental shareholders to
exercise the options and exercise all the rights that would accompany the
form of shares into which those temporarily frozen (only in government
hands) options would morph. This should serve as a significant buffer to
the analysis that the federal government holds a control position in TARP
companies, which is so central to this Article's analysis concerning the
resultant complications for corporate theory and practice.
Second, in conjunction with, or even despite an absence of, the frozen
shares recommendation, this Article recommends that the Treasury and
the Federal Reserve set up trusts to hold their ownership that create an
explicit obligation for those entities to maximize long-term shareholder
wealth in the invested TARP companies. This would be accompanied by a
waiver of the federal government's sovereign immunity with respect to
state corporate law, as well as a waiver of its immunity under section 3(c)
of the Exchange Act and attendant immunity provisions of the EESA.
Third, also in conjunction with (or despite a lack of) the preceding
recommendations, this Article suggests that the federal government as a
shareholder should execute a Rule 10b-5 trading plan similar to the type
filed by executives to protect against liability for insider trading. This plan
should be binding on the Treasury by law, with appropriate ranges of trade
amounts to leave a reasonable measure of discretion for Treasury
bureaucrats on each trading date, to minimize the threat of insider trading
by the Department and cement a near-term exit date for the government
from its positions in private businesses.
The issues presented in this Article are far more than theoretical
exercises. The theory and practice of corporate and securities law governs
the exercise of power in the securities market. The average American,
either directly through his or her holdings in mutual funds, or derivatively
as a beneficiary of public or private pension funds, enjoys the lion's share
of profits and losses in that market. Careful attention must be paid to any
overriding force, such as the government's ownership via the bailout,
which disrupts the order and evolution of that market. The federal
government's position as the dominant shareholder in the financial
services and automotive sectors requires careful consideration of its
Vol. 27:2, 2010
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shareholder rights. Governments are a unique brand of shareholder.
Without forethought about how those shareholder rights and
responsibilities will be managed, the unintended consequences to capital
markets could be dramatic.
I. History of Company Ownership by the Federal Government
Government ownership of corporations is not without precedent in
the United States. Amtrak, for instance, is a government-owned company.
3
The first government-created business in the United States was the Bank of
the United States, created by a congressional action in 1791, which
authorized the United States to own twenty percent of the bank
corporation's stock.4 Lebron v. National Railroad, a 1995 Supreme Court
case, states "[T]he Federal Government continued to charter private
corporations" for the next century, such as the Northern Pacific Railroad
Company, "but only once participated in such a venture itself: the Union
Pacific Railroad, chartered in 1862 with the specification that two of its
directors would be appointed by the President of the United States."5
3 See Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 385-86 (1995) (summarizing the
status of Amtrak and the history of government-owned corporations in the United States). As
Lebron chronicled:
Amtrak is incorporated under the District of Columbia Business Corporation Act, D.C.
CODE ANN. § 29-301 et seq. (1981 & Supp. 1994), but is subject to the provisions of that
Act only insofar as the [Rail Passenger Service Act (RPSA)] [which created it] does not
provide to the contrary, see § 541. It does provide to the contrary with respect to many
matters of structure and power, including the manner of selecting the company's board of
directors. The RPSA provides for a board of nine members, six of whom are appointed
directly by the President of the United States. The Secretary of Transportation, or his
designee, sits ex officio. § 543 (a)(1)(A). The President appoints three more directors with
the advice and consent of the Senate, § 543(a)(1)(C) .... The President appoints two
additional directors without the involvement of the Senate, choosing them from a list of
names submitted by various commuter rail authorities. § 543(a)(1)(D) .... The holders
of Amtrak's preferred stock select two more directors, who serve 1-year terms. §
543(a)(1)(E). Since the United States presently holds all of Amtrak's preferred stock,
which it received (and still receives) in exchange for its subsidization of Amtrak's
perennial losses, see § 544(c), the Secretary of Transportation selects these two directors.
The ninth member of the board is Amtrak's president, § 543 (a)(1)(B).
Lebron, 513 U.S. at 385.
4 Id. at 386-87. "That Bank expired pursuant to the terms of its authorizing Act 20 years
later. A second Bank of the United States, the bank of McCulloch v. Maryland," was later created by a
bill providing that the United States would own twenty percent of its stock, and the "President
would appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, 5 of the Bank's 25 directors, the
rest to be elected annually by shareholders other than the United States." Id. That bank's charter
also expired in 1836. Id. at 387. See generally Richard W. Painter, Ethics and Corruption in Business
and Government: Lessons from the South Sea Bubble and the Bank of the United States (Minnesota
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 06-32, 2006), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/so3/papers.cfm?abstractid=920912.
5 Lebron, 513 U.S. at 387 (citation omitted).
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Congress, in 1902, facilitated the construction of the Panama Canal by
authorizing presidential purchases of "the assets of the New Panama Canal
Company of France, including that company's stock holdings in the Panama
Railroad Company, a private corporation chartered in 1849 by the State of
New York."6 The United States thus became "the sole shareholder of the
Panama Railroad, and continued to operate it under its original charter,
with the Secretary of War, as the holder of the stock, electing the Railroad's
13 directors."
7
It was during the First World War that "large-scale use of
Government-controlled corporations" 8 began. But it was during the Great
Depression that government corporations truly came into the limelight,
guided by the goal of stabilizing the economy and making distress loans to
farms, homeowners, banks, and other enterprises. 9 To offer one eerie echo
of the past, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) was created to
make loans to banks, insurance companies, railroads, land banks, and
agricultural credit organizations, including loans secured by the assets of
failed banks, sharing a nearly identical driving goal to that of the TARP
program. 10
The RFC sought to execute its authority by forming a number of
corporations, at times under state law and at times under federal charter."
Once the Second World War ended, government involvement in
corporations had become widespread, and concerns about their
accountability led to calls for the government to rein in government
6 Id. (citing Act of June 28, 1902, Pub. L. No. 57-183, 32 Stat. 481); see also GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REFERENCE MANUAL OF GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS, S. DOc. No. 79-86, at 176
(1945) [hereinafter GAO CORPORATION MANUAL].
7 Lebron, 513 U.S. at 387 (citing JOINT COMM. ON REDUCTION OF NONESSENTIAL FED.
EXPENDITURES, REDUCTION OF NONESSENTIAL FEDERAL EXPENDITURES, S. Doc. No. 78-227, at 20
(1944)).
8 Lebron, 513 U.S. at 388. "In 1917 and 1918, Congress created, among others, the United
States Grain Corporation, the United States Emergency Fleet Corporation, the United States Spruce
Production Corporation, and the War Finance Corporation," none of which were publicly traded
and all of which were also dissolved after the war. Id.
9 Id. (citing R. MOE, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, ADMINISTERING PUBLIC FUNCTIONS AT THE
MARGINS OF GOVERNMENT: THE CASE OF FEDERAL CORPORATIONS 6-7 (1983)).
10 Lebron, 513 U.S. at 388 (noting that a few corporations, such as the Tennessee Valley
Authority (TVA), brought the government into the commercial sale of goods and services); see also
Act of May 18, 1933, ch. 32, 48 Stat. 58 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 831-831ee (2006)).
11 See Lebron, 513 U.S. at 388-89. "In 1940, Congress empowered the RFC to create
corporations without specific congressional authorization." Id. at 388. For example, the RFC
created the Defense Plant Corporation, the Defense Supplies Corporation, the Metals Reserve
Company, the Petroleum Reserves Corporation, the Rubber Development Corporation, and the
War Damage Corporation, among others. See GAO CORPORATION MANUAL, supra note 6, at 32, 38,
169, 182, 219, 279; see also Lebron, 513 U.S. at 389 ("Other corporations were formed, sometimes
under state law, without even the general congressional authorization granted the RFC. For
example, the Defense Homes Corporation was organized under Maryland law by the Secretary of
the Treasury, using emergency funds allocated to the President ... and the Tennessee Valley
Associated Cooperatives, Inc., was chartered under Tennessee law by the TVA. By 1945, the
General Accounting Office's Reference Manual of Government Corporations listed 58 Government




corporations. 12 Congress then passed the Government Corporation Control
Act (GCCA). 13 One of the more important provisions of the GCCA for our
purposes was that it "ordered the dissolution or liquidation of all
government corporations created under state law, except for those that
Congress should act to reincorporate; and prohibited creation of new
Government corporations without specific congressional authorization."
14
In the 1960s new corporate entities were formed. Many of them were
merely government agencies located within the existing Government
structure.15 Starting in 1962, however, the Government began sponsoring
corporations that were not designated as arms of the federal government
under the GCCA. The first of these corporations, "the Communications
Satellite Corporation (Comsat), was incorporated under the District of
Columbia Business Corporation Act."16 Comsat was entirely privately
capitalized. 17 In sharp relief against its counterparts "that had in the past
been deemed part of the Government, Comsat's board was to be controlled
by its private shareholders; only 3 of its 15 directors were appointed by the
President." 18
The Comsat model was explicitly created with the purpose of
permitting a private company to raise private capital, while also enjoying
preferential treatment from the government at the same time.1 9 The
government soon followed in creating other corporations, nearly all of
which were under the direct control of the federal government and none of
which were publicly traded.
20
The final noteworthy examples of government-owned corporations
are Fannie Mae ("Fannie") and Freddie Mac ("Freddie"). Both were
government-chartered but shareholder-owned and publicly traded
12 See Lebron, 513 U.S. at 389-90.
13 See id. (citing Government Corporation Control Act, 59 Stat. 597 (codified as amended
at 31 U.S.C. §§ 9101-9110 (2006)). "The GCCA required that specified corporations, both wholly
owned and partially owned by the Government, be audited by the Comptroller General.
Additionally, the wholly owned corporations were required, for the first time, to submit budgets
which would be included in the budget submitted annually to Congress by the President" Id.
(citing FRANCES J. LEAZES, JR., ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE BUSINESS STATE 22-23 (1987)).
14 Id. justice Scalia also notes in Lebron that "in the years immediately following World
War II, many Government corporations were dissolved, and to our knowledge only one, the Saint
Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation, was created." Id.
15 See id.
16 See id. Comsat was created with the express purpose of entering the private sector,
but doing so with government-conferred advantages. See MOE, supra note 9, at 22.
17 See Lebron, 513 U.S. at 390 (citing Harold Seidman, Government-Sponsored Enterprises
in the United States, in THE NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY: THE PUBLIC USE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR 92 (B.
Smith ed., 1975)).
18 See id. at 390-91 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 733(a) (1994)).
19 See id. at 391 (citing MOE, supra note 9, at 22, 24).
20 Id. ("But some of these new 'private' corporations, though said by their charters not to
be agencies or instrumentalities of the Government, and though not subjected to the restrictions of
the GCCA, were (unlike Comsat) managed by boards of directors on which Government appointees
had not just a few votes but voting control.").
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companies. 21 In one part of their business, they would aggregate
mortgages into pools and sell interests in the pools, known as mortgage
backed securities (MBS). 22 They would guarantee the credit risk on those
mortgages, or the risk that the mortgage holders would default, for roughly
$2 trillion of such mortgages. 23 As of 2008, they guaranteed roughly $3.7
trillion in liabilities. This growth was substantial, particularly compared to
$2.9 trillion in all outstanding corporate bonds and $4.4 trillion in
outstanding Treasury debt trading at the time.
Fannie and Freddie present an interesting case study for how
government-owned firms are managed, and how they are perceived by the
market. The Treasury did not own an equity interest in Fannie and Freddie
until it recently placed them under conservatorship after the prospect of
their insolvency had arisen. 24 The President did however have the ability,
written into Fannie and Freddie's charters, to place directors on the board,
which through voting is also one of the central powers granted to
stockholders. The federal government also implicitly guaranteed the debts
of Fannie and Freddie, which makes the comparison to TARP banks all the
more useful since the Treasury's capital injections and equity holdings in
TARP banks have also been accompanied by a debt guarantee, and
governments universally tend to continue to guarantee debts of companies
in which they hold an equity interest.
25
From its creation until the government sold its shares in Comsat to
Lockheed Martin, Comsat was a publicly traded corporation. In effect, it is
probably the one example from modern history that comes close to the
unique aspects of the Treasury's TARP holdings, namely government
controlling ownership in a publicly traded, state-incorporated company.
Yet the full implications of this fact never truly developed in the Comsat
example due the government's short tenure as owner. The federal
21 See PETER J. WALLISON, AM. ENTER. INST. FOR PUB. POLICY RESEARCH, REGULATING FANNIE
MAE AND FREDDIE MAC: Now IT GETS SERIOUS (2005), available at
http://www.aei.org/docLib/20050513-FSOMay-g.pdf.
22 Id.
23 See id. They would also hold some of the MBS in their own portfolios, thus holding
both the credit risk and the interest rate risk associated with the mortgages, and attempt to hedge
those risks through other transactions. This accounted for another $1.5 trillion.
24 Peter J. Wallison, Private Profits, Public Risks, WALL ST. J., Mar. 24, 2008, at A19.
Congress oversaw a regulator created to oversee only the two government-sponsored enterprises
(GSEs). Fannie and Freddie were originally chartered by Congress as federal agencies, but were
later privatized by a sale of equity in their operations to private shareholders in order to ensure
that their purchases and sales of mortgages could be removed from the federal budget. Members of
Congress expected Fannie and Freddie to subsidize low-income borrowers.
25 PETER J. WALLISON, AM. ENTER. INST. FOR PUB. POLICY RESEARCH, MORAL HAZARD ON





government did not own any common shares in the other close analogues
to TARP, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.26
Despite a rich history of government involvement in creating business
and privatizing government functions as business, there is no precedent for
the unique confluence of factors for those businesses that have taken TARP
funding in exchange for giving the government an ownership, and often
controlling, stake. We find no example from among this rich history in
which the government owned a controlling stake in a publicly traded
business incorporated under state law. That unique fact is the wellspring
for the thesis of this Article, that the architecture of corporate and
securities law is unprepared for the theoretical and mechanical challenges
that accompany government ownership in private businesses.
One may argue that temporary government ownership to facilitate
bank liquidation, for instance the authority frequently used by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), should also be considered
government ownership of private business. Bank nationalization can come
in two distinct forms. It can be short-term, dedicated solely to the orderly
windup of a bank's assets, as in the FDIC's process for winding up failed
banks that are FDIC insured or the creation of the Resolution Trust
Corporation to deal with the savings and loan crisis of the early 1990s. The
second possibility is a long-term period of government ownership
designed to alter the lending policies of a bank. It remains to be seen
whether the second form of nationalization accurately characterizes the
government's holdings in the financial sector under TARP.
Thus the government's ownership of private business is not without
precedent. And yet, the complications that the government's ownership
through TARP present are entirely novel. First, as the vast majority of these
examples were created by government charter, they would not be subject
to fiduciary duty laws that apply to state-chartered companies under state
corporate law. The situation of government-controlled shareholders being
exempt from fiduciary principles while all the other shareholders in the
company are not, analyzed in this Article, would not be present. Second,
the government-chartered corporations were not created with the intent of
subsequently divesting the government of any ownership or power over
the companies they own, which is not true for the government's ownership
under TARP. As a result, a number of entirely novel complications arise for
corporate and securities laws from the government's TARP ownership.
This Article offers some initial analysis of these complications.
26 One distinction, of course, is that Comsat, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac were all
originally created by the government, whereas most of the TARP firms were not.
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1I. The Troubled Asset Relief Program
In response to a dramatic credit freeze that put unprecedented
pressure on financial institutions in late 2008, the U.S. government
initiated a $700 billion bailout of the financial industry that mainly
consisted of the Treasury purchasing equity in troubled banks under the
TARP. In order to execute its mandate under the EESA to ensure the health
of the nation's banking system, the Treasury Department purchased
controlling interests in hundreds of the nation's largest banks, GM and
Chrysler, as well as the insurance conglomerate AIG, and GMAC, the
financing arm of GM.
As part of that bailout, the Treasury took preferred shares, and
subsequently initiated a plan to convert those non-voting preferred shares
into shares convertible into voting common equity in banks participating in
TARP. The Treasury's initial experiment in holding common equity took
place at Citigroup, in which it took a controlling 34% voting stake.
The original plan for the TARP program was for the government to
use the $700 billion authorized under the EESA to buy and sell troubled
assets.27 That plan was quickly shelved, and the Treasury Department
immediately began a number of different programs. I will omit description
of some of the programs falling under TARP, and focus only on those
directly linked to the government's accepting equity positions in return for
its injections of TARP capital.
Under the Capital Purchase Program (CPP), the Treasury made
investments in six hundred forty-nine banks of $203 billion, of which eight
institutions received a total of $134 billion. 28 As of April 2010, $70 billion
of that has since been repaid. Through the Targeted Investment Program
(TIP), the government invested an additional $40 billion in Citigroup and
Bank of America. 29 The CPP is the central link to the Treasury's equity
investment in the financial sector. Of the $203 billion it spent, $25 billion
went to each of Bank of America, Citigroup, JPMorgan, and Wells Fargo. 30
Another $10 billion went to each of Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley. 31
When combined with the TIP, the federal government's investment in Bank
of America and Citigroup becomes $45 billion each. 32 Initially recipients
under the CPP were not permitted to buy back their shares for three years,
but that was modified by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
27 OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM,
QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 3 (uly 21, 2009) [hereinafter SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT].
28 Id. at 4.
29 Id.





2009 to permit banks to buy back their CPP shares in consultation with
their banking regulator.
33
Under the initial terms of the CPP, banks receiving capital injections
gave the government preferred shares with a 5% dividend for five years,
which then increased to 9% after five years, and warrants to purchase
additional common shares. 34 Participants in the CPP may redeem the
preferred shares at face value after three years. 35 In addition, the Treasury
may sell them at any time. 36 Valuing the government's TARP shareholdings
is tricky, owing to the nature of the credit market freeze-up and problems
in marking MBS and credit default obligation (CDO) assets to market.
However, for our purposes considering them at cost will give some idea of
the scale of shareholdings.
The second major industry supported under the TARP program is the
automotive industry, in particular Chrysler, GM, Chrysler Financial, and
GMAC. GM has been the beneficiary of $49.5 billion under TARP, Chrysler
$14.9 billion, GMAC $13.4 billion, and Chrysler Financial $1.5 billion.
3 7
Currently all of the shares in the reconstituted GM, after its emergence
from bankruptcy, are owned by the U.S. government (60%), the Canadian
government (12%), former bondholders (10%), and the GM health care
trust (18%).38 The reconstituted GM is not publicly held, and as the major
theories of corporate law discussed in this Article apply to widely held
companies (and not privately held ones), GM would not be a good example
for that analysis. In the event that GM is publicly listed while the U.S.
government remains a shareholder, as is currently anticipated, that would
change. Further, the private bondholders and the health care shareholders
will still expect fiduciary duties from the government as the controlling
shareholder, and in some jurisdictions those fiduciary duties are stronger
for privately held companies than for publicly held companies.
39
The Treasury Department's statement on the GM restructuring says
that it intends to manage its investment in Citigroup in a "hands-off,
commercial manner."40 The Treasury published a white paper regarding
its ownership in GM in which it offered four key principles for how it would
try to minimize political influence in GM's operations, and yet there is no




37 Id. at 94.
38 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, FinancialStability.gov Fact Sheet: Obama
Administration Auto Restructuring Initiative, General Motors Restructuring (June 1, 2009),
http://www.financialstability.gov/latest/05312009_gm-factsheet.html [hereinafter Auto
Restructuring Fact Sheet].
39 See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975).
40 Auto Restructuring Fact Sheet, supra note 38.
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mechanism by which those principles can be enforced by a third party, nor
are there any penalties for their violation.
4 1
On March 30, 2009, the President's Auto Task Force determined that
Chrysler's restructuring plan was not likely to permit it to emerge from
bankruptcy, and pressured Chrysler to arrange a merger deal with Fiat.
4 2
The U.S. government also took an 8% stake in Chrysler in exchange for its
loan, but Fiat took a 20% stake and the United Auto Workers Health Care
Trust took a 55% stake.
43
The Treasury Department obtained a 35% ownership stake in GMAC
from GM. 44 GMAC is a provider of automobile financing spun off from GM.
The government has announced its intention to use GMAC to promote the
financing, and therefore the purchases, of automobiles from companies
taking TARP funding.
45
The government also invested another $70 billion in AIG through the
Systemically Significant Failing Institutions Program. 46 Under the Making
Home Affordable Program, the Treasury offered to use nearly $50 billion in
TARP funding, in conjunction with at least $200 billion from the Federal
Reserve, to support Fannie and Freddie, both of which are now wholly
owned by the federal government under conservatorship. 47 Citigroup also
received generous support by way of a $5 billion TARP investment to
support an asset guarantee program supporting $301 billion in Citigroup's
troubled assets. 48 Various other TARP loan programs provide for asset
guarantees and auto warranty guarantees for other companies, many of
which took part in the programs described thus far.
Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner announced a sweeping change
to the TARP program on February 25, 2009. 49 He announced that all banks
with over $100 billion in assets would be subject to stress testing. He also
announced that the CPP would be replaced with a Capital Assistance
41 SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, supra note 27, at 111. The report lists the following core
principles in the Treasury's White Paper: (1) seeking to dispose of its ownership interest as soon
as practicable, (2) reserving the right to set upfront constraints to protect taxpayers, promote
financial stability, and encourage growth, (3) protecting the taxpayer's investment by managing its
ownership stake in a hands-off, commercial manner, and (4) voting on core governance issues,
including the selection of a company's board of directors and major corporate events or
transactions. Id.
42 Id. at 107.
43 Kate Linebaugh, Five Chrysler Directors Are Named, WALL ST. J., July 6, 2009, at B2.
Since control is by its very nature an exclusive concept, it would be a difficult argument to say that
the government is a controlling shareholder of Chrysler with Fiat and the United Auto Workers
Health Care Trust holding such large stakes.
44 SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, supra note 27, at 110.
45 Id. at 112.
46 Id. at 32.
47 Id. at 36.
48 Id.
49 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, U.S. Treasury Releases Terms of Capital




Program (CAP), which would involve the Treasury taking preferred shares
convertible into common equity rather than the type of preferred shares
used under CPP. CAP was instituted to support the nineteen largest
financial institutions taking TARP money by serving as a backstop source
of liquidity for those banks after they undergo a stress test designed to
determine their long-term liquidity needs.5 0 To date, no institutions have
taken capital under the CAP program. One of the requirements of the CAP
program is that participating banks give the government convertible
preferred shares that have the option of conversion into voting common
equity.5 ' The CPP preferred shares carried a 9% dividend, and would be
convertible at the issuing bank's option subject to regulatory approval.
Secretary Geithner would also permit banks with preferred shares issued
under the CPP to exchange them for CAP convertible preferred shares, and
renamed TARP the "Financial Stability Program." 
52
On Friday, February 27, 2009, Citigroup and the Treasury reached an
accord whereby some of the Treasury's preferred shares in Citi were
converted into common equity.5 3 Immediately the price of shares in Citi fell
39% to reflect the dilution of other common equityholders, and share
prices in other banks fell in anticipation of similar conversions at other
banks.5 4 This allowed Citi to avoid dividends required under those
preferred shares.5 5 The Treasury also announced that other banks that
wish to convert their preferred shares will be able to do so at a 10%
50 SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, supra note 27, at 52.
51 Id. at 53.
52 In many ways Secretary Geithner's plan to stabilize banks through issuance of
preferred stock convertible into common equity can be traced back to a proposal by the
investment bank Friedman Billings Ramsey (FBR) advocating the practice in November 2008.
PAUL J. MILLER, JR. ET AL., U.S. FINANCIAL SYSTEM STILL NEEDS AT LEAST $1.0 TRILLION TO $1.2
TRILLION, 1 (2008), available at
http://onine.wsj.com/public/resources/media/Financial-Strategy-20081119.pdf. FBR advocated
that "if the government would convert TARP capital issuances into pure, tangible common capital
(akin to the $23 billion class C investment in AIG), it would go a long way toward encouraging
subsequent private investment." Id. That analysis also led the march to focus on tangible common
equity ("TCE") rather than tier 1 capital as the true indicator of bank financial health. Both are used
to examine a bank's health, since the ratio of equity to assets (loans outstanding) of a bank
compares the residual interest of common stockholders to the pool of loans in which they have an
interest. If either ratio is too low, it means the bank is overleveraged. The Treasury's TARP
preferred shares were included in the tier 1 capital ratio, but not the TCE ratio. At the time, FBR
urged that TCE at the largest eight financial institutions was 3.4% of assets, implying 29x leverage,
and that $1 trillion in new common equity would be necessary to bring TCE back into normal
alignment. Id. at 2. FBR urged that tier 1 capital, which included TARP preferred stock, was not a
good measure of leverage because the preferred stock had a liquidation preference. Id. at 1, 9. FBR
also argued that injections of capital connected to preferred stock was something that banks would
not use to lend, because that lending would put pressure on its TCE ratio (because preferred
shares do not help the TCE ratio, but additional lending would make it look more leveraged). Id. at
9. The Treasury adopted essentially the same justification for the conversion in its statement
announcing its conversion of Citigroup shares.
53 David Enrich & Deborah Solomon, Citi, U.S. Reach Accord on a Third Bailout, WALL ST.
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discount to the February 9, 2009 prevailing stock price.5 6 Twenty billion
dollars worth of the Treasury's Citigroup preferred shares were not
included in the deal.5 7 When the Treasury Department exchanged its non-
voting preferred shares for voting common equity in Citigroup on June 9,
2009, it executed an Exchange Agreement to govern the transaction.5 8 The
opening clauses of that agreement evidence the government's lack of
interest in maximizing the value of its investment with an explicit
statement of intent that its investment is motivated in part by its desire to
stabilize the financial system generally.59
Citigroup has agreed to restrictions on its lobbying activities during
the term that the government continues to own an interest in it.60 Pursuant
to its Exchange Agreement with the federal government, Citigroup also
remains bound by the Employ American Workers Act.6 1 Citigroup also
remains bound by the Home Affordable Modification Program by the terms
of its Exchange Agreement.62
Under the terms of the Exchange Agreement, the government agrees
to begin to sell off its interest in Citigroup by June of 2019 at a rate of 20%
of its holdings yearly.63 This may permit it to remain a control shareholder
for longer than that ten-year period in light of the large size of its current
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Exchange Agreement Between Citigroup Inc. and United States Department of the
Treasury, June 9, 2009,
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/831001/000 119312509128765/dexlO3.htm
[hereinafter Exchange Agreement].
59 Id. at 2. This desire is clear by the Treasury's very act of converting its shares when
the conversion makes no economic sense for the Treasury as a shareholder. One reason for the
conversion then is that it will artificially increase the bank's common equity, which will give it a
good TCE number when the Treasury begins its promised stress testing regime for unhealthy
banks. The Federal Reserve has indicated that it will focus on TCE in performing stress tests on
banks, in contrast to its previous focus on tier 1 capital. David Enrich & Monica Langley, U.S. Eyes
Large Stake in Citi, WALL ST. I., Feb. 23, 2009, at A2. This is, however, an entirely artificial
construct. TCE serves as a good proxy for a bank's health when it reflects the market's interest in
becoming the residual beneficiary of fees from the bank's loan portfolio, but here it merely reflects
the federal government's willingness to bail out a bank without concern for future price
appreciation in its shares. The distinction is entirely arbitrary when the holder in either case is
more concerned with other objectives than maximizing the value of its shares. This also presumes
that the market is as obsessed with TCE as the Treasury and FBR suggest. In essence, the Treasury
is completely rewriting the rulebook with its new stress testing regime. This means it can alter the
ratios it emphasizes, or create an entirely new one, drawing the market's focus to the new metric.
One way to alleviate the consequences of holding common equity, while helping the banks' TCE
number at the same time, would be the frozen options proposal explored in Section VII.B of this
Article. The Treasury, the Federal Reserve, and the FDIC could make changes to the definition of
TCE in the regulations and in the new stress testing regime to highlight those options as a
significant element of common equity in that calculation.
60 Exchange Agreement, supra note 58, at 47.
61 Id. at 51.
62 Id.
63 See id. at 52; Press Release, Citigroup, Citi Announces Public Share Exchange Launch,
Finalizes Definitive Agreement with U.S. Government (June 10, 2009),
http://www.citibank.com/citi/press/2009/090610a.htm.
Treasury Inc.
34% holdings-potentially sixteen to eighteen years depending on the
amount of other outstanding shares in Citigroup at that time.
The Treasury retains nearly all of its voting rights under the Exchange
Agreement. That agreement initially states that the Treasury will vote its
shares in proportion to all other shareholders' votes, but exempts
"Designated Matters" from that policy. 64 Those Designated Matters include
nearly all matters on which a shareholder might be interested in voting,
including the election and removal of directors, the approval of any
business combinations, the approval of a sale of substantially all assets of
the Company, approval of a dissolution of the company, approval of new
securities, and approval of amendments to the charter or bylaws. 65 The
exchange of securities under the Exchange Agreement was subject to
shareholder approval, and yet the government's interim securities prior to
the approval were so coercive as to effectively guarantee that the Exchange
Agreement would be approved by the shareholders. 66
At a total of $50 billion, next to AIG, Citigroup is the second largest
recipient of TARP money. And unlike AIG, where the government has an
80% stake, the government has a sub-majority control block of 34% in
Citigroup. As such, Citigroup will become the most useful real world
example for the theoretical and legal analysis presented in this Article.
Particularly, the next Part will conduct extensive analysis of the level of
control that the federal government has exercised over Citigroup.
III. The Federal Government as Control Shareholder
Control is an elusive concept, but it forms an important part of
corporate and securities law. It triggers fiduciary duties for control
shareholders under state corporate law, as well as a number of
applications under the federal securities laws. Some provisions enhance
the burden or liability facing controlling shareholders or persons, while
others will specifically prohibit actions that create certain control
relationships. 67 Consequences of being deemed in control of a company
under the Securities Act of 1933 (the "'33 Act" or the "Securities Act") and
the Exchange Act, include limits on the controlling person's ability to sell
securities in the controlled company unless the securities have been
registered and the sale follows various required methods. 68 Rule 405 of the
Securities Act forms the basis for the Securities Act's nebulous definition of
shareholder control as "the possession, direct or indirect, of the power to
64 Exchange Agreement, supra note 58, at 53.
65 Id.
66 SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, supra note 27, at 68.
67 A.A. Sommer, Jr., Who's "in Control'?-S.E.C., 21 Bus. LAW. 559 (1966).
68 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2006) [hereinafter "Securities Act"];
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78oo (2006) [hereinafter "Exchange Act"].
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direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of a person,
whether through the ownership of voting securities, by contract, or
otherwise."
69
One of the more costly results of being deemed a control person under
the securities laws is exposure to joint and several liability with offending
issuers for violations of the securities laws. 70 Section 15 of the Securities
Act mandates joint and several liability for control persons of issuers liable
under section 11 and section 12, and section 20(a) of the Exchange Act
mandates joint and several liability for control persons of issuers held
liable under the Exchange Act, including Rule 10b-5. This is a stark
departure from the individual liability protections of the corporate form.
In some areas, the securities laws take a direct approach and
prescribe a certain percentage of ownership as constituting control, such
as with the presumption in the Investment Company Act of 1940 that a
25% ownership position in a company constitutes control. 71 Some of the
provisions of the securities laws also take a bright-line approach to
regulation of transactions that are based on concerns about controlling
shareholders. The proxy rules require filing a Schedule 13D upon taking
ownership in 10% of the voting securities of an issuer.7 2 Section 16 insider
trading liability also accrues for 10% shareholders.
73
Through Rule 405 under the Exchange Act the SEC has further offered
that "[t]he term control (including the terms controlling, controlled by, and
under common control with) means the possession, direct or indirect, of
the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies
of a person, whether through the ownership of voting securities, by
contract, or otherwise."
74
However, for the most part the Securities Act and the Exchange Act of
1934 do not provide an explicit definition of just what circumstances lead
to control. This has led to much uncertainty and a variety of case law, staff
interpretations, and no-action letters exploring the factors that the SEC will
use in determining control under those two statutes.
Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means, the original students of the
separation of ownership and control, state:
[C]ontrol lies in the hands of the individual or group who have the actual
power to select the board of directors (or its majority).... Occasionally a
measure of control is exercised not through the selection of directors, but
through dictation to the management, as where a bank determines the
69 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2009).
70 Sommer, supra note 67, at 560-61.
71 Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(9) (2006).
72 Rule 13d-1, 73 Fed. Reg. 60,050 (Oct. 9, 2008) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239,
240, 249), available at http://www.law.uc.edu/CCL/34ActRIs/rulel3d-l.html.
73 Exchange Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (2006).




policy of a corporation seriously indebted to it. In most cases, however, if
one can determine who does actually have the power to select the directors,
one has located the group of individuals who for practical purposes may be
regarded as the "control."
75
Thus Berle and Means also recognize that control, though occasionally an
issue of contractual rights, is typically more a question of shareholder
power.
Former SEC Commissioner A.A. Sommer, in a groundbreaking article
on the topic, discusses a question that is relevant to the central thesis of
this Article: "How little stock may a person own or have the power to vote
and still be considered a controlling person? This depends upon many
circumstances. Principal among these are the distribution of the other
shares and the other relationships the shareholder has with the
corporation and with other shareholders." 76 Sommer goes on to note that
"[o]bviously, the more widely dispersed voting stock is generally, the
amount necessary to control is smaller."
77
A substantial line of authority supports the proposition that either the
power to control or actual exercise of control is sufficient. In re Walston
and Co., an SEC opinion, holds that the power to control could be evidenced
by a creditor's right to 90% of profits, status as the source of most of
Walston's business, and option to acquire stock.78 This was despite the fact
that the creditor did not participate in the actual management of the
business and held no actual stock.79 In effect, the power to control is
sufficient to make one a controlling person, despite the fact that the power
is never actually exercised.
This is analogous to the government's position with respect to many
TARP banks. The U.S. government is a substantial creditor of the
companies in addition to owning positions in them, 80 and also holds the
ability to substantially affect the bank's underlying business through its
discretion in setting capital requirements and limiting bank operations.
Under this view, the fact that the Treasury or the Federal Reserve did not
engage in active management of TARP banks, and the fact that the
Treasury's ownership in most TARP participants is non-voting, would be
irrelevant to the government's power to control the banks.
SEC v. Franklin Atlas Corp.81 also supports the notion that percentage
of stock ownership is not, alone, determinative. In that case, a manager
75 ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
66-67 (Transaction Publishers 1991) (1932).
76 Sommer, supra note 67, at 568.
77 Id at 569.
78 Exchange Act Release No. 2603, 7 SEC Docket 937 (Aug. 8, 1940).
79 Sommer, supra note 67, at 564 (citing Exchange Act Release No. 2603, supra note 78).
80 See supra Part II (discussing TARP's background).
81 154 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
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with the ability to control an enterprise was determined to be a control
person, even though he actually owned no stock and the company had a
different controlling shareholder who owned a majority of the stock. This
does not mean that shareholding is irrelevant to the determination; to the
contrary, it is generally the most frequently utilized measure.
For the purposes of state corporation law, shareholders deemed to be
in control of the corporation owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to
minority shareholders. 82 In Delaware, "a shareholder owes a fiduciary duty
only if it owns a majority interest in or exercises control over the business
affairs of the corporation."83 Rather than using a bright-line test of control,
the Delaware courts will examine the factors surrounding a shareholder's
relationship with the board to determine whether that shareholder is
exercising actual control. In re Cysive, a 2003 Delaware Court of Chancery
case, strongly supports a finding that the Treasury is a control shareholder
in Citigroup after conversion of its preferred stock into nearly 36% of
Citigroup's common equity.84 Determinations of control for other TARP
participants would be case dependent, but the strong contractual rights the
Treasury secured under the initial round of TARP would also support an
inference of control. The government's ownership positions in many other
TARP companies are smaller than that in Citigroup, and some of them are
held in the form of non-voting preferred stock. And yet the government's
exercise of power over those firms, in addition to the contractual rights it
has under TARP, is revealing.85
As one particular example of the government's exercise of power,
consider the wide authority that the Treasury Department has placed
under the auspices of the Treasury Department Special Master for
Compensation (or "Pay Czar"). A discussion of how TARP morphs
corporate law would be incomplete without mentioning the executive
compensation restrictions included in TARP regulations that are
interpreted by the Pay Czar. Section 111 of the EESA was amended by the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act to provide the Treasury with
some final guidance for the initial executive compensation provisions
82 See generally Roberta S. Karmel, Should a Duty to the Corporation Be Imposed on
Institutional Shareholders 60 Bus. LAW. 1, 2 (2004).
83 Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334,1344 (Del Ch. 1987).
84 In In re Cysive, a person holding 35%, and an option to purchase another 0.5% to
1.0%, of the stock was deemed to be a controller because he was also Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer, and his brother and brother-in-law, who were both employed by the company,
held another 0.5% of the stock. In re Cysive, Inc. S'holders Litig., 836 A.2d 531, 535, 552 (Del. Ch.
2003). By contrast, the Delaware Court of Chancery has also held that a 46% stockholder was not a
controlling stockholder where the 46% stockholder was limited to electing two members of the
board for a period beyond the merger at issue in the litigation and was subject to certain
restrictions on the purchase of additional shares. In re W. Nat'l Corp. S'holders Litig., No. 15927,
2000 WL 710192, at *25-26 (Del. Ch. May 22, 2000).
85 For example, nearly all TARP recipients must vet their compensation packages




included in that bill. 86 The Treasury's interim final rule applies the
executive compensation rules to covered officers of companies based on
the amount of TARP funding received.
8 7
There are a number of restrictions that will apply to these covered
employees. First, the only bonuses they are permitted to receive must
come in the form of restricted stock, and must not exceed one-third of the
executive's total compensation. 88 There are also restrictions requiring that
the TARP companies exercise any clawback rights they may have, disclose
efforts to minimize excessive risk, limit golden parachute payments, and
disclose any perqs that exceed $25,000.89 The Treasury Department also
created a Pay Czar position to issue advisory opinions with respect to these
rules, as well as to review compensation for firms receiving exceptional
assistance.9 0 As the interpreter of the executive compensation restrictions
included in the EESA and the stimulus bills, and as the only entity able to
give TARP recipients an exemption from coverage, the Treasury gains
significant leverage over high-ranking executives who work for TARP
recipients, over whose personal compensation the Treasury has become
the final arbiter.
Thus we see that as defined under both corporate and securities law,
considering the position and powers of a shareholder is one useful method
to determine the presence of control. It is not, however, the only method.
The actual exercise of authority is also useful.
The Treasury and the Federal Reserve have exercised considerable
authority thus far. A prime example of that exercise is revealed by the
government's ongoing relationship with Citigroup. At one meeting, the
federal government pressured Citigroup to find six new independent board
directors acceptable to the U.S. government. 91
In using its control over Citigroup to cause it to end dividend
payments to preferred stockholders, the Treasury implicitly pressured the
other preferred shareholders to convert their shares into common
equity.9 2 Those preferred shareholders who exercised the conversion were
able to do so at a preferential stock price of $3.50 per share.93 The
government's regulatory oversight, and its oversight as a holder of a
controlling stake in Citigroup, is coordinated through four agencies: the
86 SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, supra note 27, at 118.
87 Id. at 121. Covered employees are determined based on TARP money taken.
88 Id. For more on the use of restricted stock to minimize risk, see Sanjai Bhagat &
Roberta Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation: Focusing and Committing to the Long-Term,
26 YALE I. ON REG. 359 (2009).
89 SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, supra note 27, at 121.
90 Id. at 122.
91 Joann S. Lublin, Citi Board Revamp Faces Hurdles, WALL ST. I., Feb. 28, 2009, at B3.
92 Peter Eavis, Paying the Price To Rebuild Citi, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 2009, at B12.
93 Id.
Yale Journal on Regulation
Treasury, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal
Reserve, and the FDIC.
94
In an attempt to minimize fears of nationalization, Chairman
Bernanke indicated that the federal government would avoid taking
majority stakes in banks whenever possible.95 But this ignores analysis of
real control. The Treasury Department has recognized that minority
interests in companies can effectuate control in its own regulations. In the
rules promulgated to implement the Foreign Investment and National
Security Act of 2007, whereby the Committee on Foreign Investment in the
United States (CFIUS) reviews foreign governments that invest in U.S.
companies, the Treasury takes an expansive view of control.9 6 It indicates
that a 10% interest is a strong presumption of control, but is willing to
consider smaller stakes as controlling. Under the CFIUS definition, the
Treasury's CAP Citigroup shares are firmly defined as a controlling interest
in those securities at 36% interest. They would also be considered a
controlling interest under the SEC's definition, and meet the definition of
control shareholder under state corporate law.
97
The Treasury Department has converted its preferred shares in
Citigroup into common equity, giving it a position of up to 36% of Citi's
outstanding voting equity. This means that as defined under Delaware
corporate law, the securities laws, and even the CFIUS process for
reviewing foreign investments in U.S. companies, the U.S. Treasury is a
control shareholder in Citigroup. Further, the remaining unconverted
preferred shares in other banks issued to the Treasury by TARP
94 Monica Langley & David Enrich, Citigroup Chafes Under U.S. Overseers, WALL ST. J., Feb.
25, 2009, at Al.
95 Sudeep Reddy, Bernanke Eases Bank-Nationalization Fears, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 2009,
at A2.
96 See Regulations Pertaining to Mergers, Acquisitions, and Takeovers by Foreign
Persons, 31 C.F.R. pt. 800 (2009). Specifically, "control" is defined as the "power, direct or indirect,
whether or not exercised, through the ownership of a majority or a dominant minority of the total
outstanding voting interest in an entity, board representation, proxy voting, a special share,
contractual arrangements, formal or informal arrangements to act in concert, or other means, to
determine, direct, or decide important matters affecting an entity; in particular, but without
limitation, to determine, direct, take, reach, or cause decisions regarding the [matters listed in §
800.204(a)], or any other similarly important matters affecting an entity." See id. § 800.204(a).
Two points should be emphasized concerning this definition. First, it eschews bright lines.
Consistent with the existing regulations, control is not defined in terms of a specified percentage of
shares or number of board seats. Although shareholding and board seats are relevant to a control
analysis, neither factor on its own is necessarily determinative. Instead, all relevant factors are
considered together in light of their potential impact on a foreign person's ability "to determine,
direct, or decide important matters affecting an entity." Second, echoing the congressional views
expressed in the conference report accompanying the original legislation in 1988, the focus of the
statute and therefore of these regulations is a control person controlled by or acting on behalf of a
foreign government. For example, a transaction involving a foreign person's acquisition of nine
percent of the voting shares of a U.S. business in which the foreign person has negotiated rights "to
determine, direct, decide, take, reach, or cause decisions regarding" important matters affecting
that business would be a covered transaction. Id.




participants give the government substantial leverage over corporate
policy decisions at those banks.
The Treasury's exercise of its new power over Citigroup has already
begun, and some of the ways in which the Treasury's interests and the
long-term profitability of the bank may come into conflict have already
been revealed. Citigroup has begun to cave to political pressure to engage
in corporate policy decisions that, though unprofitable for the bank, are
politically useful to its government regulators. It announced a plan to lower
mortgage payments by an average $500 per month for those homeowners
who have recently lost their jobs and are more than sixty days behind on
their mortgages. 98 Borrowers who have lost their jobs may be particularly
poor bets for workouts, as they lack stable cash flows to pay even reduced
mortgages. Citigroup also expressed support for a congressional plan to
allow judges to modify mortgages, legislation it opposed prior to receiving
preferential treatment from the Treasury, and which the rest of the
banking industry opposed.99 The federal government has pressured
Citigroup to "sell business lines that don't mesh with the company's core
mission."1 00 Further, one account suggests that the jumble of conflicting
orders and oversight from the agencies overseeing Citigroup and
congressional interest has strained Citigroup's ability to operate
effectively.101
Congressional pressure has often related to issues that represent a
miniscule effect on the Treasury's balance sheet or income, particularly
executive compensation and perqs, including the use of corporate
airplanes.' 02 After taking control of the IndyMac Bank, the FDIC also
adopted a policy of modifying mortgages with the aim of "keeping
mortgage holders in their homes," which suggests a diminished concern for
corporate profitability.
10 3
In order to minimize what they see as political misuse of those events
to spur public outcry, banks participating in TARP have cancelled employee
reward programs and training events that are immaterial compared to
their budgets but that management believes otherwise serve a useful
function.' 04 Citigroup also explored cancelling its marketing sponsorship of
the New York Mets' stadium for the same reason.10 5
98 Ruth Simon, Citi To AllowJobless To Pay Less on Loans, WALL ST. I., Mar. 3, 2009, at A4.
99 Id.
100 See David Enrich, Citi To Sell a Portion of Stake in Redecard, WALL ST. I., Feb. 20,
2009, at C2.
101 Langley & Enrich, supra note 94.
102 Id.
103 Sudeep Reddy, Taking the Nationalization Route To Fix the Banks, WALL ST. J., Feb.
24, 2009, at A4.
104 Robin Sidel, Capital Clash: Banks v. Rescue, WALL ST. I., Feb. 10, 2009, at C3.
105 David Enrich, Matthew Futterman & Damian Paletta, Citi Explores Breaking Mets
Deal, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 2009, at Al.
Yale Journal on Regulation
Another concern with the Treasury's equity in Citi is that, with the U.S.
government as a controlling stakeholder in a bank, other governments will
alter their policies toward international branches or divisions of that bank
in order to extract diplomatic concessions from the U.S. government. 106
Another unintended consequence of the Treasury's bailout has been that
customers have gravitated to bailed-out institutions, giving those
institutions which participated in TARP a competitive advantage over
competitors that were ironically safer prior to the bailout.1° 7 This dynamic
is likely to continue as long as the Treasury holds stakes in banks,
particularly in light of the observation that government-owned banks
receive regulatory preferences and are more likely to obtain government
backing than non-government-owned institutions.
Citigroup is a useful example to consider, but the government's
exercise of control and its conflicts spread out over all TARP recipients. The
potential for conflicts in the Treasury's financial company TARP holdings in
banks is vast. For one thing, wealth management is a cornerstone business
for investment banks. In large part, this translates to tax planning and
helping clients to legally avoid taxes on their assets. Investment banks also
finance mergers and acquisitions ("M&A") activity that can result in
downsizing and plant closures in targeted firms. This could result in
political pressure to reduce M&A financing and deal advisory relationships
by labor and regional constituencies. Auto, consumer, and home loans are
another major business for investment and commercial banks. All of these
groups can seek to pressure political overseers at TARP banks to subsidize
their lending. TARP banks might be pressured to subsidize lending through
lower interest rates to certain geographic areas or certain income groups,
resulting in a loan portfolio with risk not matching its expected future cash
flows. TARP banks might be pressured to subsidize lending to state and
local governments, or close operations overseas. TARP banks might be
pressured by overseas governments to extract diplomatic concessions
from the U.S. government. This dynamic might also spill over into the
automotive TARP recipients, which would permit the government to
achieve through its TARP equity powers what it may not be able to achieve
through other environmental and labor regulatory powers.
Citigroup stands as the prime example for the government's exercise
of control over the institutions that have taken TARP money. It is likely that
the lower the percentage ownership the government has in a TARP firm,
the lower its control. As such, its potential to control likely drops quickly as
one goes beyond the top twenty or thirty TARP banks. This Part has
106 David Enrich, Heidi N. Moore & Joann S. Lublin, Citi Nears Stake Deal, WALL ST. I., Feb.
26, 2009, at C3.
107 Doug Cameron, MF Global Cites TARP Fallout, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 2009, at C3. In the
brokerage area, for instance, segregated client funds held by banks participating in TARP rose by
26% from August 2008 to November 2008, while funds in institutions that did not participate in




omitted analysis of AIG, in which the government has an 85% stake, Fannie
and Freddie, which the government completely owns, and GM, in which the
government is also a majority owner. 108 But the Citigroup example reveals
how equity holdings can give government shareholders particular power,
which when combined with regulatory authority can make a shareholder
that would otherwise be non-controlling suddenly obtain control.
IV. Shareholder Control Meets Sovereign Immunity
As explored in more depth in other areas of this Article, controlling
shareholders have significant liability to other shareholders under law.
This Article notes that the government as a shareholder may have a
political interest in pursuing goals that directly harm the interest of other
shareholders in the corporation. And yet, one of the novel aspects of the
government's holdings under TARP is that it has substantial sovereign
immunity from liability as a controlling shareholder.
Generally, the United States is immune from suit unless it waives its
sovereign immunity and consents to being sued.109 The government's
sovereign immunity also extends to its agencies unless Congress has
consented to suit.n 0 As a general observation, waiver of the sovereign
immunity of the United States "cannot be implied but must be
unequivocally expressed."'' Determining the nature and extent of the
government's sovereign immunity for a particular kind of suit is a
complicated exercise. First, we begin with a general presumption of
immunity. Then we will need to determine if liability fits under one of the
waivers to sovereign immunity passed by Congress. Finally, we will need to
analyze the application of one of the express limits on liability found in
either the EESA or the federal securities laws.
Pursuant to the Tucker Act," 2 the Court of Federal Claims has
jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States
founded upon the Constitution, any act of Congress, any regulation of an
executive department, or any express or implied contract with the United
States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in
108 Though GM is not publicly traded, at some point the government will slowly sell off
its shares, and at that time it is likely to become as cogent an example of government control as the
other examples in this Article.
109 See United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983) (holding that it is "axiomatic
that the United States may not be sued without its consent and that the existence of consent is a
prerequisite for jurisdiction").
110 Gilbert v. DaGrossa, 756 F.2d 1455, 1460 n.6 (9th Cir. 1985).
111 United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969) (quoting United States v. Sherwood, 312
U.S. 584 (1941)).
112 For more on the difficulty in prosecuting Tucker Act claims in other contexts, see
Adam Mossoff, Patents as Constitutional Private Property: The Historical Protection of Patents Under
the Takings Clause, 87 8.U. L. REv. 689, 711 (2007).
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tort.113 The Tucker Act confers no substantive right of recovery, and such a
right must be grounded in a contract, a statute, or a regulation.11 4 Further,
claims under the Tucker Act are permitted solely for suits seeking an
award of monetary damages." 5
A claim for damages under the Tucker Act must originate in another
source of federal law that can be interpreted to mandate compensation for
which the government is liable; a plaintiff needs to prove that a reasonable
reading of the statute would mandate damages."
6
In order for a plaintiff to prevail on a Tucker Act claim that might exist
under the list of claims generally found under state corporate law, the
claim would need to be included in one of the enumerated categories listed,
and "state corporation law" is not included. The only avenue, if any, which
would apply is a violation of the Constitution. Takings Clause litigation is a
substantial body of Tucker Act jurisprudence. One theory which may
potentially be squeezed under that umbrella would be a novel theory that
the diminishment in share value resulting from the government control
shareholder's actions constituted a taking under the Constitution.
Takings Clause cases are particularly difficult to win." 7 In order to
establish a regulatory taking under the Fifth Amendment, the Penn Central
case uses a fact-based inquiry that considers (1) the economic impact of
the action on the claimant, (2) the effects of the governmental action on the
reasonable investment-backed expectations of the claimant, and (3) the
character of the governmental action. 1 8 The first prong would be
complicated by the difficulty of measuring the effect of, for example, M&A
deals encouraged by the control shareholder when no independent auction
was completed. As such, there would be no economic damage to effectively
measure. The second prong may be difficult for any plaintiffs who
purchased their investment after TARP began, or with the expectation that
the government may bail out the bank or automotive company and take a
controlling equity position, as the investment-backed expectations prong
requires a showing that the plaintiff acquired an interest "in reliance on a
state of affairs that did not include the challenged regulatory regime."" 9
The third prong may be difficult for a plaintiff to meet in light of the
113 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2006); see also 32B AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 1997.
114 See United States v. Connolly, 716 F.2d 882, 885 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
115 United States v. Jones, 131 U.S. 1, 9, 18 (1889) (noting that enactment of the Tucker
Act did not expand the powers of the Court of Claims beyond judgments for money).
116 Samish Indian Nation v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 54 (2008).
117 Robert Meltz, Takings Law Today: A Primer for the Perplexed, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 307,
311 (2007).
118 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).




government's articulation that its ownership interest and exercise of
power is intended to minimize damage to financial markets.
120
The second avenue to attempt under the Tucker Act is to use an
implicit waiver argument. The Supreme Court has held that "[w]hen the
United States enters into contract relations, its rights and duties therein are
governed generally by the law applicable to contracts between private
individuals,"'121 and that once the United States waives its immunity and
does business with its citizens, it does so effectively as a party never
cloaked with immunity.122 One could argue that share ownership is merely
a form of contractual relations that happens to be governed by an extensive
set of mandatory and default rules that constitute the law applicable to
those particular "contracts between private individuals." If that reasoning
holds, then it would seem that the EESA may constitute the sole limitation
on suit against the government's actions in putting pressure on the
corporation. Arguing that share ownership is a contractual relation would
be unlikely for Delaware corporations, however. The Delaware Court of
Chancery has been careful to maintain a clear distinction between contract
law and corporate law. 123
Even if plaintiffs were to seek compensation under the Tucker Act in
the Court of Federal Claims, they would not be able to obtain the types of
remedies that corporate law plaintiffs typically seek. Injunctions against
mergers are one of the more frequent remedies that plaintiffs obtain in the
Court of Chancery, and a claim based solely on the Tucker Act would not be
open to such a remedy. 24 One of the reasons that Chancery will likely
120 Pub. L. No. 110-343, div. A, § 2, 122 Stat. 3766 (2008) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §
5201(1)).
121 Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Se., Inc. v. United States, 530 U.S. 604, 607 (2000)
(quoting United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 895 (1996) (plurality opinion)).
122 Franconia Assocs. v. United States, 536 U.S. 129, 141 (2002) (citing Clearfield Trust
Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 369 (1943) (holding that "[t]he United States does business on
business terms")).
123 Compare Gale v. Bershad, No. CIV. A. 15714, 1998 WL 118022, at *5 (Del. Ch. Mar. 4,
1998) (holding that "(t]o allow a fiduciary duty claim to coexist in parallel with an implied
contractual claim, would undermine the primacy of contract law over fiduciary law in matters
involving the essentially contractual rights and obligations of [the] shareholders"), with Jedwab v.
MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 594 (Del. Ch. 1986) (holding that "with respect to matters
relating to preferences or limitations that distinguish preferred stock from common, the duty of
the corporation and its directors is essentially contractual and the scope of the duty is
appropriately defined by reference to the specific words evidencing that contract; where however
the right asserted is not to a preference as against the common stock but rather a right shared
equally with the common, the existence of such right and the scope of the correlative duty may be
measured by equitable as well as legal standards").
124 One exception to this general rule is that Congress enacted the Remand Act of 1972,
allowing the Court of Federal Claims to grant limited equitable relief. See Gregory C. Sisk, The
Tapestry Unravels: Statutory Waivers of Sovereign Immunity and Money Claims Against the United
States, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 602, 611-12 (2003) ("The court's limited equitable authority,
however, is incidental and collateral to a Tucker Act claim for a money judgment."). This changes
little, as the plaintiff would still need to make a claim for damages to sustain the complaint, and
would be unable to do so in the absence of a court order requiring an auction.
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enjoin mergers or other corporate policy decisions rather than award
damages after the fact is that damages in corporate deals (for example,
from unfair mergers) are particularly difficult to determine once a deal is
complete. 125 The practical result may be that if any Tucker Act claims were
available, plaintiffs may lose for insufficient proof of damages.
A second central waiver of government sovereign immunity for our
purposes is the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which permits suits
against officers of the federal government.126 This Act is limited in that (1)
claims for relief in the nature of "money damages" are excluded from the
APA under section 702; (2) final agency action is reviewable in court under
the APA only when there is "no other adequate remedy" in a court; and (3)
relief is precluded under the APA "if any other statute that grants consent
to suit expressly or impliedly forbids the relief which is sought."'127 As will
be discussed later in this Part, the EESA explicitly limits substantive
application of the APA to TARP purchases.
The other blanket waiver of sovereign immunity that must be
addressed in considering the federal government's immunity as a TARP
shareholder is the Federal Tort Claims Act.128 This Act is distinct from the
Tucker Act and is subject to a unique line of precedents. In addition,
jurisdiction to hear tort claims against the federal government is
exclusively granted to the United States District Courts under the Federal
Tort Claims Act and thus cannot be considered under the Tucker Act.
129
For the purposes explored in this Article, there are no viable federal
common law avenues for a suit. In particular, there is little support for the
existence of a fiduciary duty under the federal common law.130
125 For instance, if a controlling shareholder were to force a merger through a process
that was determined to be unfair to the company's other shareholders, and an auction or shopping
period was the only way to determine what the shareholders would have gotten in a fair process,
no method for determining damages would be readily available once the transaction was
consummated. Conducting a hypothetical auction would not work, since no party would have "skin
in the game." One method available would be to conduct an outside appraisal to determine the
inherent value of the business and its value to other potential bidders. As that would require
access to information from parties not privy to a suit, the lack of incentive to participate would
limit appraisal as a method to calculate the value shareholders would get from an alternative
bidder in a board process that was not subject to control by an interested shareholder.
126 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006) ("An action in a court of the United States ... stating a claim
that an agency or an officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act in an official capacity or
under color of legal authority shall not be dismissed nor relief therein be denied on the ground
that it is against the United States or that the United States is an indispensable party. The United
States may be named as a defendant in any such action, and a judgment or decree may be entered
against the United States.").
127 Id. §§ 702, 704.
128 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (2006).
129 McCauley v. United States, 38 Fed. Cl. 250,264 (1997).
130 See Roberta S. Karmel, The Securities and Exchange Commission Goes Abroad To
Regulate Corporate Governance, 33 STETSON L. REV. 849, 851 (2004) ("In Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v.
Green, the United States Supreme Court seized an opportunity to quash the development of a
judge-made federal law of corporate fiduciary duty under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act: The
Supreme Court reversed and held that Section 10(b) cases require 'deception, misrepresentation,
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A reading of the EESA, which created and authorized TARP, reveals an
even stronger protection from liability. The Treasury Secretary's decisions
pursuant to the EESA are generally subject to Chapter 7 of Title 5 of the U.S.
Code, including review for decisions that are "arbitrary, capricious, or an
abuse of discretion, or not in accordance with the law."131 It nevertheless
also provides that "no action or claims may be brought against the
Secretary by any person that divests its assets with respect to its
participation in a program under this Act ... other than as expressly
provided in a written contract with the Secretary." 132 It further provides
that "[n]o injunction or other form of equitable relief shall be issued
against the Secretary for actions pursuant to sections 101, 102, 106, and
109, other than to remedy a violation of the Constitution." 133 Those
sections give the Treasury the authority to purchase troubled assets. EESA
vests in the Secretary of the Treasury the sole authority to exercise the
rights in connection with assets acquired under the TARP program.
34
Troubled assets under the EESA are defined as "any other financial
instrument that the Secretary, after consultation with the Chairman of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, determines the
purchase of which is necessary to promote financial market stability."135
There is also no sunset provision with respect to the Treasury's ability to
hold troubled assets.
136
Abuse of discretion, the threshold in APA cases, would likely preclude
fiduciary duty review, whether by other bank shareholders or by
taxpayers. According to Cass Sunstein and Thomas Miles, the government
wins somewhere between 55% and 65% of the time under the arbitrary
and capricious review standard. 37 And yet, since arbitrary and capricious
review is principally an issue of equitable relief, the injunction exclusion
renders it mostly ineffective for the purposes of challenging the Treasury's
actions as a shareholder in banks. 138 Further, review of financial
regulators' decisions on how to provide guaranty assistance to banks is
likely to obtain wide latitude under the arbitrary and capricious standard,
or nondisclosure.' In so doing, the Court rejected the notion that the securities laws 'federalize the
substantial portion of the law of corporations that deals with transactions in securities,
particularly where established state policies of corporate regulation would be overridden."' (citing
Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462,476 (1977))).
131 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 119(a)(1)
(2008) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5229(a)(1)).
132 Id. § 119(3) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5229(3)).
133 Id. § 119(a)(2)(A) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5229(a)(2)(A)).
134 Id. § 106(a) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5216(a)).
135 Id. § 3(9)(B) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5202(9)(B)).
136 See id. § 106(e) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5216(e)).
137 See Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government's
Response to the Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REv. 463, 520 (2009) (citing Thomas 1. Miles & Cass R.
Sunstein, The Real World ofArbitrariness Review, 75 U. CHI. L. REv. 761, 777 (2009)).
138 Id.
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particularly where the decision goes to the heart of the stability of the
nation's banking system. 1
39
The EESA also does not consider application of section 3(c) of the
Exchange Act,140 which exempts the federal government from coverage by
the Exchange Act. As part of its belt-and-suspenders approach to protecting
the Treasury Secretary from liability, it also exempts decisions concerning
the disposition and management of TARP assets from injunctive relief,
14 1
even if plaintiffs are able to meet the arbitrary and capricious threshold.
There may be one useful distinction worth drawing on the application
of the EESA. It may be that the liability waivers of the EESA would apply to
government decisions on how to spend TARP funds, but would not extend
to cover the act of pressuring corporations to institute policy changes as a
result of the government's ownership in TARP recipients. The legislative
history of the EESA is necessarily limited, owing to the rapid timeframe in
which it was passed, but some sources indicate that Congress never
intended for TARP to be used to openly purchase shares in companies,
much less to use that share ownership to give it power over corporate
policy decisions at the board level. 142 As such, that argument, though useful
in evading the exemption language of the EESA, would still be no help with
trying to find a cause of action under the Tucker Act.
Though the EESA mentions the APA, it does not specifically address
the '33 Act or the '34 Act. The federal government's liability under the
federal securities laws is unclear. There is an express rejection of liability
for the federal government in the '34 Act. 143 Thus the federal government's
immunity from the '34 Act is secure under the belt-and-suspenders
protection of both the EESA and the '34 Act. The '33 Act would require a
more involved discussion. The '33 Act has no such express opt-out as is
found in the '34 Act. Quite the opposite, "person" for the purposes of the
'33 Act is specifically defined to include "an individual, a corporation, a
partnership, an association, a joint-stock company, a trust, any
unincorporated organization, or a government or political subdivision
thereof."' 4 4 Since "person" is a reference included throughout the '33 Act to
regulate conduct by participants in the securities markets and expose them
139 See, e.g., Huntington Towers, Ltd. v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 559 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1977).
140 See infra note 322.
141 Pub. L. No. 110-343, div. A, tit. i, § 119(a)(2)(A) (2008) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §
5229(a)(2)(A)).
142 See Nouriel Roubini, Is Purchasing $700 Billion of Toxic Assets the Best Way To
Recapitalize the Financial System? No! It Is Rather a Disgrace and Rip-Off Benefitting Only the
Shareholders and Unsecured Creditors of Banks, ROUBINI GLOBAL ECON., Sept 28, 2008,
http://www.roubini.com/roubini-monitor/253783/; see also Paul Krugman, Doing the Right
Thing?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2008, http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/10/09/doing-the-right-
thing/.
143 See Exchange Act § 3(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(c) (2006).
144 Securities Act § 2a-2, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(2) (2006).
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to liability for inappropriate conduct, 145 it would not seem that the intent
behind the '33 Act was to shield the government from liability.
The inclusion of governments in the meaning of "person" in the '33
Act may be an avenue for liability under the '33 Act. This would be limited,
however, to section 12 violations. It would not include Rule 10b-5
violations, nor would it encompass putting pressure on boards in ways that
harm the value of the enterprise unless such action was also accompanied
by a material omission from a registration statement or prospectus or
failure to deliver a prospectus.
The '34 Act states:
No provision of this title shall apply to, or be deemed to include, any
executive department or independent establishment of the United States, or
any lending agency which is wholly owned, directly or indirectly, by the
United States, or any officer, agent, or employee of any such department,
establishment, or agency, acting in the course of his official duty as such,
unless such provision makes specific reference to such department,
establishment, or agency. 1
46
This provision is also relevant to the determination of control shareholder
status. If the Treasury, Fed, or an established trust is not considered a
control shareholder for the purposes of the '34 Act, then it may not share
joint and several liability under the securities laws.
The next issue is whether individuals appointed to the board of
directors share any governmental immunity. The Federal Reserve's
holdings in AIG, purchased mostly through TARP funds, were placed under
the ownership of a trust. There is an open question as to whether the trust
is actually independent from the government. 147 The Treasury Secretary
has indicated his intent to place common stock held in Citigroup into a
similar trust sometime in the future. Thus the analysis of sovereign
immunity would need to continue to consider application to the trustees.
If the trust or its trustees are not considered to be agents or officers of
the United States, the analysis becomes much more complicated. 148 The
sovereign immunity of the United States from suit without its consent does
not extend to its officers or agents, 149 and an action against an official or
agency of the United States is not necessarily a suit against the United
145 See, e.g., id. § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e.
146 Exchange Act § 3(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(c) (2006).
147 See AIG, Where Is the Taxpayer Money Going?: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Oversight and Government Reform, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of J.W. Verret) [hereinafter
Verret Testimony], available at
http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/documents/20090512175538.pdf.
148 See generally 91 C.I.S. United States § 222 (2000).
149 Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1971); Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v.
Pierson, 284 F.2d 649 (10th Cir. 1960).
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States. 5 0 Where defendant's conduct is such as to create a personal
liability, the fact that the defendant is an officer of the United States does
not forbid a court from taking jurisdiction in a suit against him or her.' 5 '
Generally, "[r]elief sought nominally against an officer is in fact
against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the latter."15 2 For
the most part, a suit is considered one "against the sovereign if the
judgment sought would expend itself on the public treasury or domain, or
interfere with the public administration, or if the effect of the judgment
would be to restrain the government from acting, or compel it to act."
15 3
However, "it is not an easy matter to reconcile all the decisions of the Court
in this class of cases."15 4 It is unclear whether a suit against the AIG trust
would ultimately result in an expenditure by the government. The
indemnification provisions of the AIG trust begin with a requirement that
AIG indemnify them for any liability that they face as trustees, but the
Federal Reserve agrees to indemnify any amounts AIG is unable to
provide iss It does seem that a judgment against the AIG trustees would
result in restraint on the government's ability to fulfill its purposes, in light
of how the AIG Trust Agreement includes various provisions that compel
the trustees to meet their fiduciary duty to the Treasury and to consider
the effect of their decisions on capital markets more broadly.
To the extent that the government places control of its TARP
securities in a separate entity by establishing a trust, as it did with AIG, a
shift may occur in the relationship between determining the existence of a
control shareholder and the existence of immunity. The more that the AIG
trust is determined to be a government actor, the more likely it will be in
control of the company. However, to obtain the protection of sovereign
immunity, the trust would want to show that it is a government entity.
There are very few limitations on trustee indemnification in the AIG
Trust, and trustee fiduciary duty is defined in a vague way such that the
Treasury's interpretation on the reach of immunity would likely control.'
5 6
Despite a lack of immunity from the laws referenced above, the documents
creating the AIG Trust would limit the reach of liability even if sovereign
immunity does not cover the AIG trustees. Legislation currently pending
150 Smith v. Am. Asiatic Underwriters, Fed., Inc., U.S.A., 134 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1943) (on
appeal from the U.S. Court for China); Archbold v. McLaughlin, 181 F. Supp. 175 (D.D.C. 1960).
151 Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949); United States ex
rel. Brookfield Constr. Co. v. Stewart, 234 F. Supp. 94 (D.D.C. 1964).
152 Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
153 Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted).
154 Larson, 337 U.S. at 698.
155 See AIG Credit Facility Trust Agreement Dated as of January 16, 2009, Among Federal







may change the nature of any future trusts set up by the Federal Reserve or
Treasury.
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V. Implications for Corporate Law Theory
This Part will examine the kaleidoscope of theories commentators
have offered in their efforts either to justify existing structures in corporate
and securities law or to urge reform. Those theories will be examined in
light of the presence of a controlling government shareholder that enjoys
sovereign immunity. This Part will show that of the six central theories
used in corporate law, including classic agency and contractarian thought,
shareholder primacy, director primacy, the team-production model, and
progressive corporate law, none of them supports the presence of the
federal government as a control shareholder in a publicly traded company.
Even more than that, these theories that serve to illuminate corporate law
debates and rarefy the opposing parties tend to break down entirely when
considered with the presence of such a shareholder.
A. Agency Theory
Agency theory is the bedrock of corporate law most frequently cited in
its theoretical development, and is the first well-developed building block
in the debate. The standard Michael Jensen and William Meckling story of
agency costs has been used to explain the relationship between
shareholders and the board of directors. Where the providers of capital to
an enterprise, the shareholder principals, and the users of that capital, the
managerial agents, are both utility maximizers, there is reason to believe
that the agents' interests can conflict with their principals' interests.
15 8
Then in order to maintain capital flows, manager agents will incur bonding
costs to assure principals, and principals will incur monitoring costs to
minimize instances of agents' abusing their authority over the principals'
capital. 159
One complication to this model for government shareholders is that
the notions of utility that are being maximized will substantially change.
Thus the government shareholders and the other shareholders will have
different definitions of utility. Indeed, their utility priorities may be in
direct contravention to each other. This will make monitoring and bonding
157 See TARP Recipient Ownership Trust Act of 2009, S. 1723, 111th Cong. (as
introduced in Sept. 2009).
158 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 1. FIN. ECON. 305,308 (1976).
159 Id.
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more difficult, as the agents will have to serve two masters rather than just
one. 160
And yet, in light of the fact that government equity holdings go hand in
hand with government bailouts, the other shareholders will be the
beneficiary of the government subsidy. They will, however, be adversely
affected by the distorted incentives for risk-taking that the government
subsidy will also engender. Balancing these benefits against their costs will
substantially alter their monitoring costs. The infrastructure of the
securities markets has a difficult time gauging the risk of bankruptcy, with
share prices tending to fall dramatically near a bankruptcy event. The
share prices of Fannie and Freddie are an acute example. 161 Shareholders
have to gauge the likelihood of the Treasury giving further bailouts, or
deciding to take the firm into receivership. This sort of political risk is
difficult for them to gauge, as the skills needed to do it are quite distinct
from other calculations particular to securities analysis. The risk of
bankruptcy, coupled with a corollary risk that the government will fail to
bail out a firm sufficiently to protect its equityholders, may be the sort of
tail end, black swan event that is currently being explored as prone to
bounding the rationality of investors.
162
Jensen and Meckling postulated that agency costs would depend in
part "upon the cost of measuring the manager's (agent's) performance and
evaluating it, the cost of devising and applying an index for compensating
the manager which correlates with the owner's (principal's) welfare, and
the cost of devising and enforcing specific behavioral rules or policies."' 6
3
The indeterminate nature of the government's interest and its incongruent
relationship to the goals of most other shareholders will drastically
increase these agency costs for the entire operation, which will be
evidenced by a discount in the value of minority shares in the company.
Jensen and Meckling also postulated that where capital markets are
characterized by rational expectations of profit maximization, a firm's debt
to equity ratio will be reflective of the agency costs of monitoring that
firm's managers. 164 Governments as shareholders, with their unique
160 When risk and reward are disjoined, incentives for well informed and prudent
management of risk are abandoned. In Fannie and Freddie's case, this took the form of improper
hedging of interest rate risk. Wallison, supra note 24, at 4. The perverse incentives created by this
government backing do not only impose costs on the guaranteed firms. They also enhance
systemic risk within the financial system, defined as the risk that a failure within one institution
can result in failure to linked institutions sufficient to cause large-scale shocks to the economy. See
Peter J. Wallison, The Evolution of a Policy Idea: How Restrictions on the Size of the GSEs' Portfolios
Became the Central Issue in Reform of Their Regulation 3-6 (Networks Fin. Inst. Working Paper, No.
2006-PB-03, 2006), available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/20060314-SystemicRisk.pdf.
161 Basic Chart for Federal National Mortgage Association, Yahoo! Finance,
http://finance.yahoo.com/q/bc?s=FNM&t=Sy&l=on&z=m&q=l&c= (last visited Feb. 14, 2010).
162 See NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY IMPROBABLE
(2007).
163 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 158, at 328.




willingness to ignore profit maximization in the value of their shares and
bailout the debt of entities in which they hold an interest, seriously
threaten this function of outside ownership. The sort of triangular agency
that results from government ownership, where the Treasury becomes
both control-shareholder principal and agent of the taxpayer, leads to an
inefficient use of resources, limiting Coase's rule 165 that firms will exist
only where the cost of market activity exceeds the cost of direct authority.
B. Contractarian Theory
The contractarian model tries to consider what rules the constituents
to the contracts at the nexus of the corporation would adopt if there were a
hypothetical bargain. 166 This view, also known as the nexus-of-contracts
theory of the corporation, is predicated on the notion that a corporation is
a product of bargained agreements. The contractarian model of corporate
law supports the use of default rules that shareholders, companies, and
constituencies are free to modify by contract. 167
Macey argues that the theory of the firm implies that the law should
respect the legal arrangements accepted by those within the firm, as it
explicitly calls for regulatory respect for private ordering.1 68 The
contractarian model is in many ways a precursor to two subsequent
corporate theories, the shareholder primacy model and the director
primacy model. Both of those offshoots of the contractarian approach
accept shareholder wealth maximization as the determining factor in
designing default rules to govern the corporate enterprise, but they differ
as to the appropriate allocation of power between shareholders and
corporate directors.
With the government being a controlling, immune shareholder, two
distinct consequences complicate the description. First, the government
can change the rules of the game. Not only that, it can change them after the
other parties forming the nexus-of-contracts have made their bargains.
Looking at the problem from one direction, globally speaking, though the
other parties are free to contract around the default rules, the lack of
predictability limits contractual freedom and increases transaction costs.
Further, the government's immunity means that, as a participant in the
process, it is immune from the rules, default or otherwise.
Therefore, the use of hypothetical bargains becomes an uneasy
exercise in examining the government as shareholder, as one of the
165 R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
166 Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A
Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1430 (1993).
167 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian
Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856,860 (1997).
168 lonathan R. Macey, Externalities, Firm-Specific Capital Investments, and the Legal
Treatment of Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1989 DUKE L.I. 173, 179.
Yale Journal on Regulation
participants to the bargain enjoys immunity from rules enforcing those
bargains, and the immune party also has the ability to change those rules
and has discretion in how it enforces them.
169
The contractarian approach also takes the view that the welfare of
constituencies like labor or the community can be more efficiently seen to
through government welfare regulation, without altering corporate profit
maximization goals. 170 But this view is warped by the presence of a
controlling government shareholder. Evidence suggests that the conflicts a
government collectively faces when regulating entities they own are
resolved in favor of preferential treatment for the government-owned
firm. 17 ' Thus, welfare regulation is no longer a reliable backstop to any
negative externalities from the subset of corporate action that may
maximize firm profits but result in a net decrease in social wealth. This
regulatory preferential treatment also has the effect of harming the
competitive position of non-government-owned firms.
C. Shareholder Primacy Theory
Shareholder primacy theory includes two bedrock principles: 1)
maximizing long-term shareholder value is the only legitimate objective of
the corporation, and 2) designing ways to assist shareholders in exerting
control through their powers, including the power to vote at annual
meetings, will minimize the agency costs that result from the separation of
ownership from control in publicly traded and diffusely held
corporations. 72 It is a direct outgrowth of agency theory.
Absent incentives for proper accountability to shareholders,
shareholder primacy scholars urge that management will be tempted to
excessively reward their efforts, engage in inappropriate levels of risk, self-
169 To offer an example of how the government changes the rules, consider the response
to AIG's payment of prearranged bonuses. See Obama Tries To Stop AIG Bonuses: "How Do They
Justify This Outrage?," CNN.coM, Mar. 16, 2009,
http://www.cnn.com/2O09/POLITICS/O3/16/AIG.bonuses/index.html.
170 Bainbridge, supra note 167, at 877.
171 Fannie and Freddie demonstrate that governments give preferential regulatory
treatment to private corporations in which they have effective control. For a substantial period of
time, Fannie and Freddie were exempt from securities regulation for their publicly traded equity
or debt. It was only in 2002 that they were finally required to register, just prior to the revelation
of accounting scandals that ultimately limited their ability to comply with those registration
requirements. Peter J. Wallison, The Fannie Freddie Time Bomb, INT'L ECON., Oct. 1, 2002, at 1.
Wallison has also showed that Fannie and Freddie were not effectively policed for antitrust
violations owing to their favored status by the executive branch. Peter 1. Wallison, Applying the
Microsoft Decision to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, AM. ENTER. INST., July 25, 2001,
http://www.aei.org/paper/14862. A legislative provision was also inserted into Fannie and
Freddie's charters to prevent shareholder lawsuits in the event of a government takeover. Holman
W. Jenkins, Jr., Rethinking the Fan and Fred Takeover, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 2009, at A13. Six weeks
before the takeover their chief regulator, James Lockhart, declared them both adequately
capitalized.
172 See generally Lucian Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV.




deal, reject efficient offers for control of the company, and over-invest the
resources of the firm.' 73 Shareholder primacy scholars favor creating
mechanisms whereby shareholders can exercise control over the corporate
policies and the membership of the board of directors can reduce these
inefficient temptations. '
74
One of the primary objections to shareholder primacy is the argument
that some special interest groups may purchase shares and use their equity
powers to vote in directors, or advance policies, that harm the interests of
most shareholders in long-term price appreciation. Lucian Bebchuk
defends shareholder primacy by observing that changes to corporate
policy or elections of new directors will require the approval of a majority
of the shareholders. 1 75 Bebchuk further argues that since money managers
tend to support management and focus on share value, the special interest
objection is unwarranted.
176
In this context, however, the majority vote limitation is no longer
present. The government would be a controlling, and particularly powerful,
equityholder for many of the companies participating in TARP.' 77 Even if
the government did not own a majority of outstanding shares, it would be
able to carry a majority of votes in corporate elections with as low as 20%
ownership stakes, owing to the low voting rates of retail investors and to
portfolio diversification requirements for pensions and mutual funds.178
Thus if the government's motives in exercising its control rights are
suspect, then the majority buffer present in most shareholder voting
contests will no longer be present to protect the other shareholders from
this problem.
Deciding whether or not to accept an acquisition offer for the
corporation is particularly prone to conflicts of interest for corporate
managers.' 79 Acquirers typically are able to offer a premium to the
shareholders for the company because they intend to run the company
more efficiently.' 8 0 This may mean replacing the company's management,
altering its compensation structure, laying off workers, or closing factories.
Under the shareholder primacy norm, if the price offered for the company's
shares is more than the underlying value of the company in the market,
then a board objective of maximizing shareholder wealth may require
173 See id.
174 See, e.g., id.
175 See id. at 883.
176 See id. at 883-84.
177 Enrich & Langley, supra note 59.
178 See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN
CORPORATE FINANCE (1994).
179 See Bebchuk, supra note 172, at 898.
180 See id.; Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON.
110 (1965).
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acceptance of the offer. 18 1 Concerned with the prospect of losing their
position, however, management may block the offer. 182 Shareholder
primacists therefore argue that management should be required to put the
question to a shareholder referendum. 183
And yet the government has an interest in limiting acquisition activity
that mirrors the joint interest of labor and management. Mark Roe has
examined how the securities laws evolved as a result of an interest group
alliance between labor and management to limit the ability of financial
intermediaries to advance interests of shareholder wealth
maximization. 184 Government institutions were the source of these laws
and an ally of the interest groups that supported them. If the government
responds to interest group pressure even through the buffer of
independent agency rulemaking, it would be even easier for it to advance
the same objectives through decisions on voting its TARP shares, which are
subject to the discretion of the Treasury Secretary.
In addition to the effects of actual acquisitions on shareholder value,
the prospect of a takeover has disciplining effects on managerial
decisionmaking. 85 There is substantial evidence that antitakeover
protections result in both managerial shirking (failure to properly manage
the business) and greater managerial self-dealing. 186 Thus, if management
feels that the Treasury is unlikely to vote in favor of tender offers for the
bank, it will be less likely to maximize returns on the bank's shares.
Bebchuk's view therefore does not consider the notion that the
shareholder electorate would include a control shareholder with
significant immunity not shared by the other shareholders, because that
was not the circumstance at the time shareholder primacy developed.
187
181 See Bebchuk, supra note 172, at 896.
182 See id. at 898.
183 See id. at 896-97.
184 See ROE, supra note 178.
185 See Bebchuk, supra note 172, at 899.
186 See id.
187 For that matter, neither does the team production model. Some other commentators
have expressed concern that the federal government as an investor would invest without concern
for maximizing the value of its securities in different contexts, including with regard to questions
of privatizing social security. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURITY FINANCING:
IMPLICATIONS OF GOVERNMENT STOCK INVESTING FOR THE TRUST FUND, THE FEDERAL BUDGET, AND THE
ECONOMY 3 (1998), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/a398074.pdf ("The 1994-1996
Advisory Council on Social Security contended that politicians would assert political pressure on
the managers of the Social Security Trust Fund to forgo investments based on the potential return
and make decisions based on criteria that would 'achieve other economic, social, or political
purposes."'); Benjamin A. Templin, The Public Trust in Private Hands: Social Security and the Politics
of Private Investment, 96 Ky. L.J. 369, 444 (2008). President Bush's Commission on Social Security
noted in its 2001 report that "Government must not invest Social Security funds in the stock
market" PRESIDENT'S COMM'N To STRENGTHEN SOC. SEC., STRENGTHENING SOCIAL SECURITY AND CREATING




For the purposes of any TARP company in which the government is a
control shareholder, therefore, that analysis would no longer be applicable.
D. Director Primacy Theory
Stephen Bainbridge is the leading proponent of the director primacy
view, which shares with shareholder primacy the view that the
maximization of shareholder wealth is the appropriate duty of directors. It
modifies the shareholder primacy view, however, by arguing that resting
authority over corporate decisions with a self-sustaining board of directors
is the best way to accomplish that objective.
To the extent that director primacy stands opposed to shareholder
power, it is a fairly easy fit to find director primacy also opposed to resting
control power in a government shareholder's hands. One of the central
justifications for the exercise of director discretion is that directors will be
held accountable for maximizing shareholder wealth by private litigants
under state corporate law. 188 If the Treasury places government nominees
on the boards of banks, those nominees will arguably be protected by
government immunity from private suit, as they are serving in an official
capacity. Director primacy also seems to argue in favor of director
discretion for non-controlled corporations, particularly since controlled
corporations are a rare case among large publicly traded companies.
Therefore, giving discretion for board decisions of banks controlled by
government shareholders does not fit with the efficiency justifications
offered for director primacy, as that model was crafted to understand the
operation of companies that are not controlled by shareholders (and is in
fact used to argue that companies should remain free from control by
shareholders).
And yet, at the same time, director primacy becomes confusing in this
area. Where the directors for whom director primacy gives support are
selected, directly or indirectly, at the behest of the government
shareholder, it becomes a difficult task to parse out how the theory fits the
present dynamic.
E. Team Production Theory
Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout's team production model serves to
justify the discretion that state corporate law vests with the board of
directors. The model explains that the members of the team vital to the
economic production of the firm join together and submit to the will of a
mediating hierarch, the board of directors, that balances the interests of
188 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 547, 562 (2003).
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the various groups. 189 It relies on contractarian thinking, but abandons
notions of shareholder primacy. Team production is a stakeholder-focused
theory that is partly aligned with the progressive corporate law view, and
partly with director primacy, but is coterminous with neither. It also stands
opposed to the shareholder primacy view. In part the team production
theory rests on a conception of the institution of corporate law as a
solution for limitations in the ability of corporate constituencies to contract
with each other.' 90
When the constituencies opt into their "mediating hierarchy" of the
board of directors,' 9 ' federal sovereign immunity from corporate laws
complicates this situation in cases where the federal government becomes
a control shareholder. Control shareholders would otherwise have
fiduciary duties to the corporation just like directors, but since the
Treasury is the control shareholder it escapes this duty. This nullifies the
status of the mediating hierarch as a creature bound by corporate law, and
makes the hierarch the servant of the control shareholder, who itself is not
bound by corporate law.
This model is complicated by the fact that the mediating hierarch in
the case of a government-controlled company can become captured by the
government. This will result in the hierarch favoring certain groups based
on those groups' ability to influence the political process regardless of the
economic contributions those groups make to the collective enterprise. 192
Blair and Stout observe that horizontal relationships between the various
parties contributing to production may be at least as important to
productive activities as vertical relationships within the firm.' 93 But in the
government-controlled case, that relationship is moved outside the firm
and becomes an exercise in obtaining political rather than economic rents.
The team production model relies in part on a corollary observation by
Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales that members of an economic team
suffering from coordination problems can improve their situation by giving
control rights to a third party who can control the team's assets and
reward the team members. The outsider is rewarded with a share of the
team's profits, which then gives the outsider an incentive to choose an
189 See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law,
85 VA. L REV. 247, 250-51 (1999).
190 See id. at 250.
191 Id. at 251.
192 Government ownership of banks is most prevalent in poor countries that have
poorly defined property rights and underdeveloped financial systems. Greater government
ownership of banks within a country is also associated with heavier regulation, greater price
controls, and higher black market exchange rates. It is also correlated with lower tax compliance,
higher corruption index numbers, and lower productivity. See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-
Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Government Ownership of Banks, 57 J. FIN. 265, 277,279,288 (2002).




efficient and productive team. 194 Indeed, Blair and Stout compare outside
oversight mechanisms to internal hierarchs and find that internal hierarchs
are more efficient monitors of the firm because those internal decisions are
made by individuals with greater knowledge. Internal mediation has
significant advantages over external mediation since in conflicts with
repeat players the internal player will have more institutional knowledge
of the individuals involved. 195
Blair and Stout argue that the fact that public corporate law insulates
directors from control by any one group means that they are able to serve
the interests of the entire corporate team contributing to the economic
growth of the organization.' 96 In the government-controlled case, however,
not only is the government able to wrest control from the board, but even
worse, its concern for maximizing the value of the enterprise is clouded by
its interest in serving political ends. Put another way, the members of the
team most able to exert political pressure on the government will be able,
through the government's holdings, to capture the board of directors.
The consequences of a corporate constituency capturing the board are
noted by Blair and Stout. The "constituency could use its power over the
board to seek rents opportunistically from other members of the
productive team, thus discouraging team-specific investment."'197 In
reference to a contested shareholder election in which all corporate
constituencies have a voice, Blair and Stout ask that we "[i]magine the
chaos ... likely to attend an election in which a firm's creditors, executives,
rank-and-file employees, and other stakeholders with unique and often
conflicting interests could vote on their favored candidates." 198 The chaos
that they observe will take place under TARP, but rather than occurring
through a corporate election it will occur within the political process of
interest group pressure on the executive branch.
F. Progressive Corporate Law Theory
Progressive corporate law theory, part of the corporate social
responsibility movement, defines the duty of directors and officers as to
society at large, rather than to specific shareholder wealth maximization.
Robert Reich analyzes one of the problems of requiring corporations to
fulfill public interest functions and serve as a nexus for transfer payments
194 Id. at 274 (citing Raghuram G. Rajan and Luigi Zingales, Power in the Theory ofa Firm,
113 Q.J. ECON. 387 (1998)).
195 See id. at 285.
196 See id. at 288.
197 Id. at 292.
198 Id. at 313.
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that would otherwise fit within the federal government's bailiwick. 199
Employer-sponsored healthcare is government-subsidized through the tax
code, and corporate social responsibility advocates fight for more
expansive coverage. But Reich argues that the distortionary effects on the
labor market from employer-sponsored healthcare make it an inefficient
system. Reich also argues that "public scoldings" of corporations serve as a
smokescreen by legislators to evade their responsibilities. 200 Balancing the
interests of so many divergent groups clouds the metric of success, which
increases transaction costs for all concerned. Directors are able to play a
bait-and-switch game with financial accountability: when earnings are
down, directors can blame their investments in socially responsible goals;
yet they can escape inconvenient social goals by pointing to the need to
raise their earnings to obtain future capital to fund even more significant
socially responsible commitments. As Bainbridge points out, "directors
who are responsible to everyone are accountable to no one."201 The
executive agency overseeing its investment can subvert public
transparency of its public role. 202 The internal corporate policies of a
private bank are not subject to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).
Progressive corporate law takes issue with the very premise of the
contractarian model. Bainbridge notes that one of William Bratton's
arguments against the contractarian model is that the hypothetical
bargains on which the theory relies may not have any one single
equilibrium outcome, but rather face potentially multiple equilibria.
203
Bratton's alternative requires judges to use flexible default rules that
would examine fiduciaries' decisions ex post with reference to intuitive
fairness. 20
4
199 See Robert B. Reich, The Case Against Corporate Social Responsibility (Goldman Sch. of
Pub. Policy Working Paper Series, Paper No. 08-003, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=12 13129.
200 Id. at 40-42.
201 Bainbridge, supra note 188, at 582.
202 One critical theory of state ownership is concerned with managerial incentives. One
aspect of the managerial view, from John Vickers and George Yarrow, is that states have a difficult
time monitoring "enterprise managers." Alexander Muravyev, Federal State Shareholdings in
Russian Companies: Origin, Forms and Consequences for Enterprise Performance 17 (Bank of Finland
Inst. for Econs. in Transition, Discussion Papers, Paper No. 12, 2002) (citing JOHN VICKERS & GEORGE
YARROW, PRIVATIZATION: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1988)), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1015707. David Skeel explains why governments may have an interest
in keeping their definition of public interest goals vague when governing the firm managers that
they oversee. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Virtual Privatization: Governance Reforms for Government-
Owned Firms, 2 J. CORP. L. STUD. 82, 94 (2002). Even putting aside the fact that such objectives may
not lend themselves to clear statement, government shareholders may not want to lose political
flexibility by binding specific outcomes, and they may want to avoid binding specific deliverables
to avoid criticism for failing to meet those goals after the fact. See id.
203 Bainbridge, supra note 167, at 866.
204 Id. at 866-67.
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Some progressive scholars also urge the necessity of communitarian
values in setting up legal regimes. 20 5 Bratton's iteration of progressive
corporate law, and his critique of the contractarian model, focuses on the
fact that the contractarians ignore the importance of trust and honor as
abiding norms in governed relations between parties; Bratton terms this a
mediative approach. 206 He rejects a formalistic approach that would
mandate conformity to any one theory of the corporation, in the way that
the contractarian approach does. 20 7 Instead, he believes that a meditative
legal decisionmaker, whether a judge or a regulator, would be able to
conform corporate law to the shifting cultural and social norms of the
time.2 0
8
One of the bones of contention between contractarians and
progressives is that the contractarian approach considers only the result of
hypothetical bargains without considering the events that actually led to
that bargain. 209 Yet in this context of a government control shareholder
with immunity, the debate over whether there has been a bargain or not
becomes somewhat irrelevant. There is no bargain. One shareholder has
control and is immune from suit by the other shareholders, and any
shareholder that does not have sufficient interest group energy to lobby for
subsidies from the government is shut out of the bargain.
One of the challenges to government ownership is that government
sets the rules that typically govern the disclosure of information between
the company and its constituent groups. Governments habitually lift
regulatory requirements for government-owned firms. Thus,
accountability for running the firm becomes difficult no matter what
normative theory of corporate law governs its affairs. This also places non-
governmental firms in a difficult position, as they are not privy to these
same regulatory preferences. So even supposing that some readily
identifiable metric for progressive objectives were available, it becomes
questionable whether constituents of the corporation can actually trust
disclosure of those metrics.
Stakeholder proponents also argue that firms are more productive
when stakeholders have greater voice in corporate policy. 210 There is some
significant debate over this question in the literature. 211 If it is true that
205 See id. at 873-74. Yet, the inherent conflict faced by the government as a shareholder
would undermine this objective. The Treasury and Federal Reserve's actions in the JPMorgan/Bear
Stearns and Bank of America/Merrill Lynch crises evidence those conflicts.
206 William W. Bratton, The Economic Structure of the Post-Contractual Corporation, 87
Nw. U. L. REV. 180, 212-13 (1992).
207 See id. at 212-14.
208 See id. at 214.
209 Bainbridge, supra note 167, at 865.
210 Id. at 878; Marleen A. O'Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate
Law To Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 899 (1993).
211 See THOMAS A. KOCHAN ET AL., THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS 153-77 (2d ed. 1994) (summarizing case studies showing generally positive but
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firms with greater employee and stakeholder participation are more
productive, the evidence does not suggest that the presence of a
government shareholder enhances productivity in this way. In fact, it
suggests that government ownership in industry, particularly in banks,
correlates with decreases in firm health, GDP growth, and access to credit.
Interestingly, many noted progressive corporate law scholars reject
nationalization of firms directly.2 12 Government ownership also seriously
harms the government's justified role as the remedy for inefficient
market externalities and unjust outcomes.
When an executive department becomes a controlling shareholder in
public corporations, it can use those private companies as tools to support
policies that would otherwise have to go through the political system of
checks and balances. This means not having to go through Congress,
including not having to submit to congressional review of budgetary
legislation. 213 It also means avoiding review of rulemaking by the courts.
214
The government can point to efforts undertaken by the private firms it
owns, but it can minimize accountability for those goals owing to its
transparency and executive discretion free from judicial or congressional
review.
VI. Implications for Corporate and Securities Practice
A. TARP Recipients Treated as Affiliates Under Securities Laws
If the Treasury is a controlling shareholder in the companies
participating in TARP, including the nation's eight largest banks, two
hundred more banks, Chrysler, GM, and AIG, it may result in each of those
companies being considered affiliates of each other as part of a controlled
variable results); Bainbridge, supra note 167, at 879 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, HIGH PERFORMANCE
WORK PRACTICES AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 5-9 (1993)). But see RAYMOND L. HOGLER & GUILLERMO 1.
GRENIER, EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION AND LABOR LAW IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 103 (1992)
(finding that "despite acclaim for the improved productivity achieved through employee
participation and ['Quality Circles,'] the evidence to support the proposition is not altogether
convincing, particularly in nonunion workplaces"); David I. Levine, Public Policy Implications of
Imperfections in the Market for Worker Participation, 13 ECON. & INDUS. DEMOCRACY 183, 185
(1992) (noting that most employee-involvement plans are unsuccessful, but claiming that those
few following Levine's criteria succeed); Arnold E. Perl, Employee Involvement Groups: The Outcry
over the NLRB's Electromation Decision, 44 LAB. L.J. 195, 204-06 (1993) (summarizing studies
finding positive economic effects of those programs).
212 See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 167, at 889.
213 For a more complete examination of how the government can use its interest as a
shareholder to engage in off-balance sheet activities, and for a corollary argument for why the
government should bring the debt of bailed-out entities in which the government owns an interest
onto the federal government's books, see J.W. Verret, Separation of Bank and State: The Bailout
Meets Federal Budget Law, BYU L. REv. (forthcoming 2011) (on file with the Yale Journal on
Regulation).




group. 2 15 This would then mean that any member of the group who sold
securities held in any other member of the group may be required to abide
by the strictures of Rule 144 in those transactions to avoid additional and
burdensome prospectus and registration requirements. 2 16
It may be the case that many, or possibly all, of the companies that
have given the federal government shares in exchange for TARP funds are
considered affiliates of each other. This has enormous implications for
their ability to sell shares. Imagine if every time Goldman Sachs'
proprietary trading operation wanted to sell shares in AIG, Citigroup, GM,
or any of the other controlled TARP companies, many of whom are publicly
traded and many of whom issue restricted securities through various
exemption, Goldman Sachs had to register that sale as a public offering,
deliver a prospectus, and be subject to section 11 liability for that
registration.
A registration statement must be in effect for the sale of a security.217
Transactions by any person other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer
are exempt.21 8 An underwriter is defined as any person who has purchased
from an issuer and any person controlling or controlled by the issuer.21 9
Rule 144 offers a safe harbor to being deemed an underwriter.220 TARP
companies sharing the Treasury Department as a control shareholder risk
their ability to make use of Rule 144 in their sales of securities of other
firms that have given the Treasury securities, or at the very least will be
required to comply with the information, holding period, and sales
restrictions requirements of Rule 144.
Any person who sells securities for the account of an affiliate may be
constrained in their ability to sell securities of the affiliate under Rule 144.
An affiliate is defined as a person who controls, is controlled by, or is under
common control with the person with whom he or she is affiliated.221 This
definition captures the same concept that is used in the definition of
control person under Rule 405(C). 22 2 Rule 405 defines control as the ability
to influence, directly or indirectly, management decisions. 223
In light of the SEC's interest in working with the Treasury Department
in dealing with the financial crisis, combined with what has been described
215 See Securities Act § 2a-11, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(11) (2006); see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.405
(2009) (defining "control").
216 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (2009).
217 Securities Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2006).
218 Id. § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 77d.
219 Id. § 2a-11, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(11).
220 This is vital, because the exemption found under section 77d exempts a sale from the
general registration requirement found in section 77e of the Securities Act only where an
underwriter is not present.
221 1 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 381 (4th ed.
2002); see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(b) (2009).
222 HAZEN, supra note 221, at 381; see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2009).
223 17 C.F.R. § 230.405(0 (2009).
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as the SEC's fight for its survival in the ongoing financial regulatory
reworking, once this issue arises it would seem likely the SEC might be
spurred to alter Rule 144 to ensure that this problem is avoided. However,
the SEC does not have the explicit authority under the Exchange Act "to set
the parameters of the section 4(1) and section 4(4) exemptions."
224
Thomas Hazen observes that Rule 144 is merely the SEC's interpretation of
a statute, and not an actual exemptive rule. Thus the SEC's ability to alter
exemptions in this area, and indeed Rule 144 itself, to protect trading by
TARP affiliates does not have the same significance as an exemption given
express statutory authorization. 225 The SEC can also choose not to enforce
registration and prospectus delivery requirements under this rule, but
private plaintiffs have an express private right of action here that the SEC
does not affect.
B. Insider Trading
Trading based on inside information is also a violation of Rule 10b-5
of the federal securities laws. 226 And yet, section 3(c) of the Exchange Act
effectuates an exemption for the U.S. government from, among other
things, insider trading laws.227 The Treasury would nevertheless cause
tremendous damage to the financial markets if it were to trade its TARP
preferred shares using the voluminous inside information it possesses
through its regulatory and market interactions with the banks
participating in TARP. This discussion is not focused on issues of fairness in
insider trading rules. 228 Rather, as the debate has been more focused on
the efficiency of insider trading, 229 it will examine the efficiency of insider
trading by the Department of the Treasury under the unique circumstances
of TARP ownership.
Though they also frequently can access inside information from
companies' interaction with state regulators, state pension funds are not
immune from insider trading liability. The Alabama State Pension Fund
224 HAZEN, supra note 221, at 452.
225 Although Hazen also notes that the SEC has general exemptive authority, Rule 144
was adopted prior to Congress's grant of general exemptive authority to the SEC. See id. at 452
nn.29-30.
226 See Securities Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 77j (2006); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-1 to .10b-21 (2009).
227 See Exchange Act § 3c, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(c) (2006).
228 Roy A. Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the
Stock Market, 53 VA. L. REV. 1425 (1967).
229 Macey explores some of the reasons why bringing ethical arguments into the insider
trading debate seems to muddle the analysis. See Jonathan Macey, Ethics, Economics, and Insider
Trading: Ayn Rand Meets the Theory of the Firm, 11 HARV. ].L. & PUB. POL'Y 785 (1988); see also
Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities
Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322 (1979); Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents,
Evidentiary Privileges, and the Product of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309; Robert J. Haft, The
Effect of Insider Trading Rules on the Internal Efficiency of the Large Corporation, 80 MICH. L. REV.




recently had to pay nearly a million dollars to the Liberty Group to settle a
claim that they traded with the knowledge that Liberty was soon to receive
a favorable licensing decision from another Alabama state agency.
2 30
In Henry Manne's seminal text on insider trading, Insider Trading and
the Stock Market, he argues that insider trading does not harm long-term
investors, that it can serve as a useful compensation tool for executives,
and that it contributes to the efficiency of stock market pricing.231 In his
book, Manne considers the prospect of insider trading by government
officials for their personal accounts, and he is critical of the practice. Manne
also notes that government officials can, by virtue of their positions, obtain
access to valuable information. 232 Manne explains that they have advance
information about corporate mergers, government contract approval, and
regulatory product approval. 233 He also observes that executive officials
may keep members of Congress informed about valuable information
contained inside the government for the purposes of obtaining political
favor, and that executives may do the same.
234
He notes that one danger of trading by government officials is that
they will change their regulatory approvals or their government contract
selection processes merely to benefit their trades. 235 The same principle
could apply to when the Treasury owns shares as an institution, and is
supported by evidence that governments tend to give regulatory
preferential treatment to companies in which they own an interest.
236
Manne notes that insider trading by government officials may also
result in a net transfer of wealth from the market to government officials,
implicating concerns about market efficiency in a way that typical insider
trading does not.237 One counter to this argument may be that in the case
of TARP companies, the use of insider information in trading ultimately
benefits the taxpayer, and thus such a transfer is justified to help cover the
cost of the taxpayer-funded bailouts. However, the dangers that the
implicit discount the shares will experience during the time the company's
health is under stress, and the accordant risk that it may obtain further
bailout money as a result, may mitigate this justification.
230 Stephen Taub, Pension Fund Pays for Alleged Insider Trading, CFO.cOM, Mar. 13, 2008,
http://www.cfo.com/Article.cfm/10855944/c_10852358?f =TodaylnFinance-lnside.
231 Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading: Hayek, Virtual Markets, and the Dog That Did Not
Bark, 31 J. CORP. L. 167, 168 (2006) (summarizing the thesis of his book, HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER
TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966)).
232 MANNE, supra note 231, at 172.
233 Id. at 174-79.
234 Id. at 179-84.
235 Id. at 178.
236 See, e.g., Daniel Berkowitz & Yadviga Semikolenova, Privatization with Government
Control: Evidence From the Russian Oil Sector 22 (William Davidson Inst. Working Papers, Paper
No. 826, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=920509.
237 MANNE, supra note 231, at 183-84.
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Some of those arguments would also apply to trades by government
officials on behalf of the U.S. government, but few insider trading scholars
could have foreseen that the government would take equity positions in
much of the automotive and financial sectors. As such, this Section will
consider the insider trading efficiency debate in light of that unique
circumstance. While recognizing the depth and importance of scholarship
challenging the logic of insider trading laws, and not taking issue with the
observations of those scholars in the standard case, this Section will seek to
counter use of those arguments to support insider trading by the
government in its positions acquired through TARP. This situation involves
some of Manne's original concerns about insider trading, but also
encompasses a broader universe. The Treasury or the Fed can obtain
information as government regulator, and also as control shareholder in
these companies. The second avenue of information is a novel concern.
One of the global observations this Section will make is that any
efficiencies that flow from insider trading by the Treasury would occur
after its exit trade, and any costs would mostly be evidenced by a discount
in the value of TARP shares prior to its exit trade-a time which also
happens to coincide with the time during which the health of the TARP
company is in jeopardy.
One fundamental difference distinguishing the analysis for the
Treasury as a shareholder is that the benefits of insider trading are
measured with the assumption that insiders will be able to engage in
continuous trading. But the cost-benefit analysis in this situation will be
distinctly different, as the Treasury only has limited authority to
repurchase shares after it sells out its position. So this situation would
likely involve one large exit trade, or perhaps a series of large exit trades
by the government. The Treasury's decision to exit would also likely
correlate with a determination that the financial crisis is over, as that is the
Treasury's mandate under the EESA. So the time period that the Treasury
still feels the financial crisis warrants its continuing to hold shares is also
the time period over which the prospect of the Treasury's insider trading
looms. Also, the fact that TARP insider trading will involve one or a limited
number of discrete trades, after which it will not be permitted, and during
which time other entities are prohibited from insider trading, will mean
that any efficiencies enjoyed from that practice will be limited.
One of the prerequisites Manne observes is that in order for insider
trading to cause no direct harm to investors, the trades should be made
anonymously, which would not be true for the Treasury's trades. 238 He also
observes that insider trading would not harm long-term investors, but
admits that it may have mixed effects on short-term trading.239 While long-
238 Manne, supra note 231, at 168.




term bias in securities markets may reduce volatility, and make costs to
short-term trading less of a concern, this situation is unique. Shares in
TARP firms were purchased under the bailout specifically with the
assumption that the banks and other companies involved may be insolvent
in the short term, and so the time horizon for both short-term and long-
term investors may be the same. Further, for banks specifically, share price
has now become an explicit element in the capital adequacy ratios used by
the Treasury, the FDIC, and the Federal Reserve to measure bank health
and institute corrective action. So during the period over which the
Treasury holds its shares, any discount flowing from the prospect of
insider trading by the Treasury would translate into regulatory penalties
as well.
Arguments about using insider trading as a device to compensate
executives 240 would not be relevant in this context, as the Treasury does
not offer performance-based compensation to its employees, and the Trust
created by the Federal Reserve to manage its ownership in AIG also does
not offer performance-based compensation to the trustees. As Manne
notes, the arguments about using corporate insider trading as a
compensation device do not apply in the context of government officials.
2 4 '
Another issue with the Treasury as insider trader is that it has a much
larger position in TARP firms than most shareholders. For instance, in
Citigroup it holds a 34% position. The Treasury will trade in large blocks,
making the effect on liquidity much more pronounced. This will be true
whether the Treasury sells its shares into the general market or back to the
company. Either way, it will affect either the short-term liquidity of the
company in its ability to meet short-term obligations, or it will have a more
significant impact on the liquidity of the market. Since the Treasury will not
be able to keep its sales from becoming public knowledge, the effect may
be more pronounced than much smaller inside trades occurring
continuously over a longer period of time.
Harold Demsetz observes that insider trading may perform a useful
function of compensating controlling shareholders for the positive
externality of their minimizing agency costs for other shareholders through
monitoring.242 At first blush this seems a relevant benefit, as the Article
argues that the Treasury is a control shareholder in many of the firms
obtaining money from TARP. But the government's interest in using the
corporation to transfer wealth to interest groups, analyzed in this Article,
would introduce agency costs of its own.
Manne also offers an argument that the predictive power of insider
trading makes markets more efficient, relying in part on foundational
240 See id. at 172-73.
241 MANNE, supra note 231, at 182.
242 Harold Demsetz, Corporate Control, Insider Trading, and Rates of Return, 76 AM.
ECON. REV. 313 (1986).
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principles from F.A. Hayek concerning the efficiency of the price system in
promoting the flow of information.2 43 Two challenges will limit the
phenomenon in the Treasury's case. First, and most importantly, Treasury
officials are not playing with their own money and do not enjoy
compensation from the trades. The career benefits they enjoy from the
insider trading are likely to be significantly bounded, as for instance getting
high praise for breaking even on TARP but experiencing diminishing
marginal returns for TARP gains beyond that hurdle. Further, the career
choices of Treasury officials, protected through civil service restrictions
and limited in performance compensation, are likely to reflect a general
tendency toward more pronounced risk aversion than for most other
insider traders.
One of the counterarguments that Manne raises to the idea that
insider trading may subject the stock market to manipulation is that
informed traders, or as he calls them "counter-manipulators," would be
able to counterbalance the effect of manipulators. 244 While this may hold in
the general case, the Treasury is a much larger control shareholder than
most other insider traders, as was previously explored. Thus the
Treasury's inside trades may be expected to strain the budget constraints
of the counter-manipulating traders.
One argument Dennis Carlton and Daniel Fischel raise against insider
trading laws is that if a company permitting insider trading were engaging
in activity that was harmful to other shareholders, then its shares would
trade at a discount in comparison to other companies. 245 In this case, I do
argue that shares in TARP firms will trade at a discount due to the prospect
of insider trading by the government, but a couple of things about this
situation are distinct from the hypothetical bargain raised by Carlton and
Fischel. First, the insider trading is done by a controlling shareholder, in a
market in which insider trading by all other shareholders is prohibited.
The control shareholder would therefore have no incentive to change the
rules if it thought its profits from insider trading were greater than the
general discount under which the shares trade. Second, this control
shareholder purchased shares during an economic recession as part of a
bailout. Third, this shareholder also has an interest in causing the
underlying firm to engage in non-profit-maximizing activities that
subsidize interest groups. As such, the government may be able to recoup
some of the losses in the value of its shares flowing from the subsidizing
activity specifically by insider trading. Finally, the control insider will
engage in one or a small series of exit trades, after which it will exit the
243 Manne, supra note 231, at 181-83. Further, as previously mentioned, the Treasury's
interest in insider trading would be more bounded than that of other insider traders.
244 See id.
245 Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L.
REV. 857, 860 (1983).
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market for good. Consequently, the incentives of the controlling
shareholder in TARP companies are distorted in a way that prevents the
implicit bargain that Carlton and Fischel use to undermine the justification
for more general insider trading laws.
Carlton and Fischel also note one benefit of insider trading is that it
permits continuous, rather than discrete, flows of information. 246 This
benefit would not apply in this situation, again because the Treasury's exit
trades would be a one-time event. Carlton and Fischel also posit that
insider trading can help deal with the problem of renegotiating agency
contracts, and offer that the possibility of insider trading allows for more
efficient effective renegotiation of executive compensation, incentivizing
managers to continue to develop and acquire appropriate investment
opportunities.2 4 7 Again, this would not work for agency bureaucrats, as
their rewards for trading would be more attenuated and bounded. Further,
remember that any efficiencies that result will be from one discrete trade.
Also, Carlton and Fischel note that executives attracted to insider trading
as compensation would likely be those who are the least risk-averse. 248 As
noted previously, bureaucrats as a group are likely to be more risk-averse,
having chosen a profession with lower risk and rewards than the private
sector executives in whose companies their department owns shares.
C State Corporate Law
In looking to state corporate law a focus on Delaware is appropriate,
as many TARP participants, including Citigroup, are incorporated in
Delaware.249 This Section will examine the rights that the Treasury has as a
shareholder in TARP firms. It will examine the obligations that the
Treasury would have as a control shareholder were it not for the sovereign
immunity protection that the Treasury enjoys. It will also consider how the
presence of a control shareholder with sovereign immunity can complicate
the existing state corporate law rights and obligations for boards,
shareholders, and executives at TARP firms that do not enjoy sovereign
immunity.
The Treasury certainly has the option to bring an action in Delaware
to pursue its state law shareholder rights. Shareholders are granted certain
rights by the corporate laws of a company's state of incorporation. Sixty
percent of the Fortune 500 have chosen Delaware as their state of
incorporation. Under Delaware law, shareholders have the right to sue the
directors of a company for violations of their fiduciary duties as directors.
They also have the right to seek an injunction of corporate mergers, seek
246 Id. at 868.
247 Id. at 870.
248 Id. at 871.
249 Exchange Agreement, supra note 58, at 6, 12.
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appraisal of the value of their shares in certain instances, and seek
inspection of the books and records of a corporation. 25 0 These litigation
rights will also need to be considered very carefully by the Treasury, and
much of the analysis concerning participation in federal securities class
actions will also apply to the Treasury's exercise of its state law
shareholder rights. The Treasury's right to litigate will not be limited to its
common equity; indeed, its preferred stock in hundreds of other TARP
recipients gives it the same rights as common shareholders. 25 One
complication that the Treasury may face in its exercise of shareholder
rights is that it may face conflicts in the exercise of those rights. For
instance, it may be the controlling shareholder of multiple defendants in a
suit, or it may be a controlling shareholder in companies on opposite sides
of a suit. Indeed, this conflict may be present for a number of types of
litigation outside of the corporate governance context.
The Treasury has previously shown a disregard for the consequences
of state corporate law in its conduct of the bailout. Steven Davidoff and
David Zaring observe that deal protection devices included in the
JPMorgan/Bear Stearns merger facilitated by the Treasury included force-
the-vote provisions that likely ran afoul of Paramount v. QVC, Blasius, and
Unocal.25 2 It may also be the case that Delaware intentionally avoids having
to face issues of corporate law that may interfere with federal policy in the
midst of financial crisis. For instance, Marcel Kahan and Ed Rock observe
that Delaware's review of the Bear Stearns deal, in which Vice Chancellor
Donald Parsons declined to review the underlying deal, represented a
strategic decision by the Delaware courts not to allow corporate law to
interfere in the government's execution of the bailout.25 3 However,
litigation concerning Bank of America's purchases of Merrill Lynch and
Countrywide are ongoing, so in that sense we can see that being a party to
the financial crisis does not give one carte blanche. 25 4 As such, with the
nadir of the financial crisis behind us, we can expect that issues of
250 See WILLIAM ALLEN, REINIER H. KRAAKMAN & GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN, COMMENTARY AND
CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 369, 453, 484 (2007).
251 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 327 (2006).
252 Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994); Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d
651 (Del. Ch. 1988); see also Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The
Government's Response to the Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463, 481 (2009).
253 Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, How To Prevent Hard Cases from Making Bad Law:
Bear Stearns, Delaware, and the Strategic Use of Comity, 58 EMORY L.J. 713 (2009). If the Delaware
Court of Chancery would actually seek to avoid interfering with the bailout, that might give the
Treasury an advantage in litigation in Delaware. Then again, once the national financial crisis cools
down it may limit any incentive in favor of comity. Also, the Delaware Court of Chancery's decision
in County of York Employees Retirement Plan v. Merrill Lynch & Co., No. 4066-VCN, 2008 WL
4824053 (Del. Ch. Oct. 28, 2008), suggests that Delaware is not unwilling to apply standard
principles of corporate law in adjudicating shareholder rights despite a firm's presence in the
center of the financial crisis.
254 See In re Countrywide Corp. S'holders Litig., No. 3464-VCN, 2009 WL 2902476 (Del.




corporation law will be important despite the Treasury's insistence on
ignoring them and despite the appearance to some that, in one case,
Delaware made a strategic decision to stay out of the mix.
Under state corporate law, shareholders that are deemed to be in
control of the corporation have a fiduciary duty to other shareholders in
the corporation. This means that if they use their influence over the
company to cause changes in corporate policy that harm the other
shareholders in the corporation, the control shareholders become liable to
the other shareholders. In particular, control shareholders that exercise
their powers out of an interest other than the best interest of the company
and its shareholders can face liability for violation of the duty of loyalty.
This notion is most famously explored in Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, in
which the Delaware Supreme Court ruled that where a controlling
shareholder receives something from a controlled corporation to the
exclusion, and the detriment, of the other shareholders in the company,
that shareholder will then be deemed to be self-dealing, and the
shareholder will face the burden of proving the entire fairness of that
business decision. 255 That standard has subsequently expanded to one that
applies the rigorous entire fairness standard to all transactions in which
the controlling shareholder obtains a benefit not shared by all
shareholders.
25 6
In the Treasury's case, such a benefit could for example be obtained in
a case in which an interest group to which the Administration feels
politically beholden obtains a benefit from the corporation that other
shareholders do not share. This could be through subsidized mortgages, a
decision to keep a dealership open despite it being a net loss to the
company, or a decision to open factories in districts of politically powerful
congressmen.
The fact that the Treasury is not constrained by control person
liability means that it is not constrained by law the way that the other
shareholders, directors, and officers are constrained. Regardless of what
reforms should be instituted in legal regimes, introducing a new player into
an existing structure with the power to trump the other players with its
sovereign immunity from the rules of the game will cause enormous
damage to the economic relations between the various players. It would be
like a group of people playing Monopoly when one of the players has the
right to ignore the rules of the game. The other players will either refuse to
play, or turn to lobbying the one player for residual profits rather than
playing the game by its rules.
The Treasury's immunity may also support immunity for directors it
supports, but only if they are deemed government officials. E. Norman
255 Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971).
256 Mary Siegel, The Erosion of the Law of Controlling Shareholders, 24 DEL. !. CORP. L. 27,
67-70 (1999).
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Veasey and Christine Di Guglielmo outline some iterations of constituency
directors: directors designated by creditors, venture capitalists, labor
unions, controlling shareholders, preferred shareholders, and other special
shareholder voting arrangements. 25 7 Veasey and Di Guglielmo observe that
"bet the company" scenarios, where the continued existence or a
substantial percentage of the assets of a company are at stake, will be
particularly prone to conflict between the interests of the corporation and
the interests of the shareholders.25 8
If the government merely uses its implicit leverage as control
shareholder, and as guarantor, to encourage the board to take action, those
directors will still be subject to fiduciary duty review. This means that
private litigants would be able to enjoin director action that violated their
fiduciary duty even though they are unable to enjoin the Treasury directly
because of the EESA. One factor which may also protect constituency
directors in this context would be if they constitute a minority of the board
of directors, and therefore escape liability where the majority of directors
in a transaction are disinterested. 25 9 Nevertheless, the existence of a
control shareholder may result in a problem for the individual director's
status as disinterested, even though the government remains immune from
liability. If the constituency director shares information with the
represented constituent it may also run into liability for violation of its
fiduciary duty.260
The biggest hurdle to holding the individual, government-constituent
directors accountable for actions they may take under the direction of the
Treasury as controlling shareholder is that, in a perverse way, the presence
of the government as shareholder may give the individual directors the
protection of the business judgment rule. The individual directors can
assert a credible claim that they acquiesced to the Treasury's demands
because the threat of retaliatory regulation from the Treasury or the other
financial regulators, or the threat that the firm would be excluded from any
subsequent participation in government loans or bailouts, could actually
make acquiescence by the individual directors the best decision for the
company. As such, the business judgment rule would protect that decision.
Therefore, holding the individual directors who are chosen by the
government liable would not be an effective substitute for an action against
the government controlling shareholder.
One important consequence of being a controlling shareholder is that
a controlling or dominating shareholder standing on both sides of a
transaction, as in a parent-subsidiary context, bears the burden of proving
257 E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, How Many Masters Can a Director
Serve? A Look at the Tensions Facing Constituency Directors, 63 Bus. LAW. 761, 763 (2008).
258 Id. at 765.
259 Id. at 773.
260 Id. at 775.
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its entire fairness. 261 With respect to the standard of review for cash-out
mergers by a control shareholder, Kahn v. Lynch provides that:
[T]he exclusive standard of judicial review in examining the propriety of an
interested cash-out merger transaction by a controlling or dominating
shareholder is entire fairness. The initial burden of establishing entire
fairness rests upon the party who stands on both sides of the transaction.
However, an approval of the transaction by an independent committee of
directors or an informed majority of minority shareholders shifts the
burden of proof on the issue of fairness from the controlling or dominating
shareholder to the challenging shareholder-plaintiff.
26 2
The independence of special committees that are charged with
negotiating interested transactions, who are supposed to prevent the
defendant from being faced with the onerous burden of entire fairness, can
become more difficult to establish by virtue of the presence of a control
shareholder. The Delaware Court has held that "unless the controlling or
dominating shareholder can demonstrate that it has not only formed an
independent committee but also replicated a process 'as though each of the
contending parties had in fact exerted its bargaining power at arm's
length,' the burden of proving entire fairness will not shift."2 6 3 Through its
sovereign immunity, the Treasury can escape damages awards for
violations of its fiduciary duty to shareholders. However, the Delaware
courts can still use their equity power to set aside or enjoin transactions
which result from violations of the controlling shareholder's fiduciary duty.
Consider, for instance, that consolidation through merger is a frequent
method by which banks grow. Moreover, when banks are on the verge of
liquidation, the Comptroller, the FDIC, and the Fed tend to try to facilitate a
merger or acquisition of the troubled bank to avoid exposing the FDIC to
261 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983); see Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil
Co., 493 A.2d 929, 937 (Del. 1985).
262 Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., Inc.,638 A.2d 1110, 1117(Del. 1994) (citing
Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710-11, and Rosenblatt, 493 A.2d at 937-38).
263 Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 709-10 n.7. The Delaware courts have also held that "[tihe
potential for coercion and unfairness posed by controlling stockholders who seek to acquire the
balance of the company's shares by acquisition requires some equitable reinforcement, in order to
give proper effect to the concerns undergirding Lynch. In order to address the prisoner's dilemma
problem, our law should consider an acquisition tender offer by a controlling stockholder non-
coercive only when: (1) it is subject to a non-waivable majority of the minority tender condition;
(2) the controlling stockholder promises to consummate a prompt § 253 merger at the same price
if it obtains more than 90% of the shares; and (3) the controlling stockholder has made no
retributive threats." In re Pure Resources, Inc., S'holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 445 (Del. Ch. 2002).
Delaware courts have also found that "the majority stockholder owes a duty to permit the
independent directors on the target board both free rein and adequate time to react to the tender
offer, by (at the very least) hiring their own advisors, providing the minority with a
recommendation as to the advisability of the offer, and disclosing adequate information for the
minority to make an informed judgment For their part, the independent directors have a duty to
undertake these tasks in good faith and diligently, and to pursue the best interests of the minority."
Id.
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substantial drawdowns. Indeed, an acquisition is often considered
preferable to a resolution because the response from counterparties and
depositors to a merger rather than a liquidation is better for the overall
health of the troubled bank. A case in point is the situation in which Bank of
America seems to have been pressured to follow through with its
acquisition of investment bank Merrill Lynch.
264
This offers one potential avenue for Chancery jurisdiction that would
not need participation by the controlling shareholder. Despite the fact that
the federal government is immune, the corporation itself is not, and
therefore theoretically the Court of Chancery could still enjoin the company
from engaging in particular transactions even if it could not hold the
control shareholder liable for doing them. But then again, determining that
the action was the result of government pressure would remain difficult, as
the government control shareholder is able to evade participation in the
suit and could thus simply ignore subpoenas for information. Further, this
would only work for challenging transactions that have not been
substantially completed.
Robert J. Rhee raises an interesting point about a little known
provision of the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) which seems
to speak to the question. He notes that section 122 of the DGCL, which
specifies the powers of corporations, lists two enumerated powers that do
not necessarily comport with long-term maximization of shareholder
wealth, and may in fact permit activities in service of the greater social
welfare that may be harmful to the corporation. 265 Section 122(9) of the
DGCL permits corporations to "make donations for the public welfare or
for charitable, scientific, or educational purposes, and in time of war or
national emergency in aid thereof."266 Rhee also notes that section 122(12)
gives a corporation the power to "transact any lawful business which the
corporation's board of directors shall find to be in aid of government
authority."
267
Rhee argues that since charitable donations may harm the
corporation, boards with government shareholders can look to 122(9) to
justify their decision to make "donations" through corporate policy
decisions determined by their government shareholder to be in the public
interest.268 First, it should be noted that 122(9) is bounded by a rule of
reason limitation. 269 As such, it could not justify actions that substantially
put the value of the corporation in jeopardy as, for instance, the Bank of
264 See generally Robert 1. Rhee, Fiduciary Exemption for Public Necessity: Shareholder
Profit, Public Good, and the Hobson's Choice During a National Crisis, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 661
(2010).
265 See id. at 701.
266 DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 122(9) (2008).
267 Rhee, supra note 264, at 704 (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(12) (2008)).
268 Id. at 701.




America/Merrill Lynch merger that Rhee describes. Rhee argues that since
Delaware courts have upheld particularly large executive compensation
payouts, they can be expected to uphold large donations, but that
suggestion is untenable as the two are entirely distinct legal questions for
dissimilar purposes and governed by distinct threads of authority.
270
Second, any power specifically granted to shareholders or the board is
itself limited by the fiduciary duty of the members of the board, which is to
say that, despite an affirmative grant of power in the DGCL, the Delaware
courts have shown a marked willingness to find use of that power to be in
abrogation of the director's fiduciary duty.2 7 1 This limitation would thus
apply to both 122(9) and 122(12).
Third, Rhee seems to accept that the recent financial crisis was a
"national emergency" such that it justifies application of either of these two
sections. It is not, however, clear from reading the legislative history of that
section that the Delaware legislature intended 10% unemployment and the
decline in the stock market we saw in September 2008 to count as a
"national emergency." The Folk Report on the 1967 amendments to the
DGCL explains the purpose behind 122(12) and the "in time of war or
national emergency" phrase from 122(9).272 That explanation reads as
follows:
Many states specifically authorize a corporation, irrespective of the
purposes stated in the certificate of incorporation, to do any lawful business
in time of war or other national emergency. Its effect is to eliminate the
necessity for a formal amendment of the certificate, by shareholder action;
and in war or emergency times, especially in a nuclear age, this may be
important. Accordingly, Delaware should, of all states, make this power clear
and unmistakeable, and protect its corporations in the exercise thereof.
Delaware's recognition of emergency situations is reflected by its enactment
of the emergency bylaws provision.273
The emphasis on nuclear attack as a central reason behind this
provision in the DGCL puts the question into clearer perspective. Though
the stock market crash of September 2008 was a major market event, no
one-day decline in the S&P 500 even ranked within the top ten highest
percentage declines in history.2 74 By Rhee's definition, we may expect to
see a "national emergency" every five to ten years. And even if the events of
270 See Rhee, supra note 264, at 703-04.
271 See Schnell v. Chris-Craft, 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971).




273 Id. (internal citations omitted).
274 Alexandra Twin, Stocks Crushed, CNNMONEY.COM, Sept. 29, 2008,
http://money.cnn.com/2008/09/29/markets/markets-newyork/index.htm.
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September 2008 were a national emergency, it is not clear that the
Treasury's actions as a shareholder in 2009 and onward occurred during a
time of national emergency such that these special provisions of the DGCL
should continue to apply.
D. Shareholder Voting
One of the basic rights afforded to shareholders is the right to vote in
elections for the board of directors. That right establishes the basis for the
balance of power between shareholders and the management of the
company. Pursuant to the purchase agreements and changes to TARP
participants' charters, the preferred shares purchased through the CPP are
non-voting shares.2 75 However, the Treasury retains significant leverage to
affect board decisions for firms participating in TARP.
One exception to the federal government's agreement not to vote its
TARP preferred shares is a provision permitting the holder of the preferred
shares to nominate two "preferred directors" to the board in the event that
the participating firm falls behind on its preferred dividend payments for
six successive quarters. 2 76 The Treasury preferred shares also retained the
right to vote on any mergers or exchange activity and on new issuance of
shares. In addition, the government mandated certain corporate
governance changes for firms participating in TARP. Assuming that the
Treasury maintains the legal authority to waive those provisions, it could
offer to do so in exchange for other changes in corporate policy.
More important to this analysis is the Treasury's decision to permit
TARP participants to convert their preferred stock into common voting
equity. Citigroup has accepted this, and other banks might as well.
Collective action constraints and rational apathy by shareholders,
particularly retail investors, can leave shareholders with as little as 30-
40% of voting equity with the ability to control the board.2 77 That means
that the Treasury may be able to control the board in most any TARP bank,
particularly any of the nine largest banks, that converts its TARP preferred
shares into common voting equity.
In 2003 and 2007, the SEC considered proposals to include
shareholder nominees on the corporate ballot.278 Though it ultimately
275 See supra Part II for background information on TARP.
276 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, TARP Capital Purchase Program: Senior
Preferred Stock and Warrants 3 (Oct. 14, 2008), available at
http://treas.gov/press/releases/reports/document5hp1207.pdf.
277 See In re Cysive, Inc., S'holders Litig., 836 A.2d 531 (Del. Ch. 2003).
278 For a summary of the battle for shareholder representation on corporate boards, and
the arguments on either side, see J.W. Verret, Pandora's Ballot Box, or a Proxy with Maxie? Majority




failed, the SEC is currently considering a new access proposal.279 Though
the Treasury has given up voting rights in the preferred shares that it
holds, that does not necessarily mean that it has given up the right to
nominate prospective directors for other shareholders to vote on under a
future SEC proxy access rule. The Treasury will certainly be able to
nominate candidates for banks in which it holds common voting equity,
and would not need even to hold a controlling stake in that circumstance.
Governments can make particularly active shareholders. For example,
state comptrollers and treasurers were the most vocal advocates of
shareholder proxy access when the 2003 reform proposal was under
consideration. 280 Roberta Karmel asserts that state-run pension funds and
labor unions have been more willing to fight to obtain influence over the
corporate ballot than mutual funds or other financial intermediaries. 28
1
E. Securities Class Actions
Section 3(c) of the Exchange Act exempts the federal government
from coverage of the Act.282 But most of those suits are prosecuted by
private plaintiffs who have been granted an implied private right to sue
that is shared with the SEC. The implied private right of action under Rule
10b-5 is a creation of judicial fiat. So even though the Treasury is likely not
subject to Rule 10b-5 because of section 3(c), it may still be able to exercise
its implied private right of action.
The right to join in, and in some cases serve as lead plaintiff in, private
litigation against firms covered by the federal securities laws for violations
of disclosure laws, registration requirements, fraud provisions, and other
rules is a powerful one. According to Cornerstone Research, since 1999
roughly a hundred federal securities class actions have settled every year
with an aggregate value that tends to track anywhere from one to ten
billion dollars. 283 In some blockbuster years that amount is higher, such as
in 2006, when the securities plaintiffs bar recovered over eighteen billion
dollars (nearly half of which was a result of the Enron case). 284
279 Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No. 9046,
Exchange Act Release No. 60,089, Investment Company Act Release No. 28,765, 74 Fed. Reg.
67,144, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2009/33-9046.pdf (proposed Dec. 18,
2009).
280 Roberta S. Karmel, Should a Duty to the Corporation Be Imposed on Institutional
Shareholders?, 60 BUS. LAW. 1, 17 (2004).
281 Id.
282 See supra Section VI.B on insider trading.
283 ELLEN M. RYAN & LAURA E. SIMMONS, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS
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Institutional investors are the lead plaintiff in almost 60% of
securities class action settlements. 285 The other plaintiffs in the class rely
on the lead plaintiff to manage the litigation on their behalf and look out for
their best interests. As the largest shareholder in the financial services and
automotive sectors, the Treasury may have to face the prospect of getting
involved in securities class actions.
To get an idea of the potential size of this activity, the California
Pension Fund ("CalPERS") provides a useful comparison. In 2009, CaIPERS
had roughly $180 billion dollars in total net assets, less than half the
current cost of TARP investments. 28 6 In 2008 alone CalPERS recovered at
least $925 million dollars through serving as lead plaintiff in securities
class action litigation. 287 Given that TARP investments could increase, and
that the financial services sector is more prone to litigation risk owing to
its place at the center of the economic recession, Treasury participation in
federal securities class actions could potentially amount to billions of
dollars per year.
One relevant question that should be considered is whether the
Treasury would be an appropriate lead plaintiff. Is there a conflict when
the government has an interest in the long-term health of the defendant?
Typically lead plaintiffs do not have an incentive to help the defendant, but
the federal government's interest in prevention of systemic stress to the
banking system may compromise the Treasury's suitability as a lead
plaintiff.288
One argument against the Treasury exercising its shareholder
litigation rights is that it would be a bad idea to sue banks that are already
under severe stress such that they pose a systemic threat to the health of
the nation's banking system. The counterargument would be a new
285 Id. at 11.
286 CAL. PUB. EMPLOYEES' RET. SYS., COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR
ENDED JUNE 30, 2009, at 6 (2009), available at https://www.calpers.ca.gov/mss-
publication/pdf/xAeMFz6gxOPeWscalpers-cafr-2009.pdf
287 See Press Release, Cal. Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys., CalPERS Recovers $30 Million from
Former UnitedHealth Group CEO (Sept. 10, 2008),
http://www.calpers.ca.gov/index.jsp?bc=/about/press/pr-2008/sep/recovers-30-million-
unitedhealth.xml.
288 Another open question is who will manage these litigation rights. Will the
Department of Justice (DOJ) or the SEC play a role? The DOJ and the SEC have expertise in
securities fraud enforcement, which is a form of litigation relatively similar to private litigation,
but there is a conflict here as well. Plaintiffs typically piggyback on SEC enforcement actions. For
instance, almost 25% of settled securities class actions since 1996 have also involved companion
SEC actions, and the median recovery of private actions tends to double when the SEC is also
involved. RYAN & SIMMONS, supra note 283, at 13. Would the agency that is charged with managing
these rights contract out the representation to a private plaintiff? This may be fraught with
controversy, as the securities class action bar is a generous donor to political campaigns. Another
interesting question is whether the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, which governs the
rights of lead plaintiffs in federal securities class actions, should be changed in light of the fact that
the federal government may become the dominant player in securities litigation. Should there be




iteration of the moral hazard argument common to banking and insurance
regulation: a bank may have carte blanche to violate the securities laws if it
knows that its control shareholder will not penalize the bank by instituting
litigation out of fear of harm to the financial system.
There are a number of mechanical issues with the Treasury acting as a
securities plaintiff. First, damages in securities class actions are measured
in a number of ways, depending on the type of news that triggers the
action. It could be triggered by news causing the share price to rise, in
which case those that sold during the fraud period suffer harm, or it could
be triggered by news that causes the share price to fall, in which case those
who bought during the fraud period can sue for the harm they have
suffered. 289 The standard method for awarding damages in the event of
bad news "is to award the difference between the price paid by the buyer
and the market price after [the] corrective disclosure."
290
Concerns of systemic interest would argue against government
participation in "bad news" securities class actions for troubled firms if the
class action award itself risks the long-term viability of the firm. One
exception would be class actions instituted after the underlying bank has
entered liquidation, in which case the effect of the class action on the bank
is no longer a problem. Richard Booth has argued that efficiency losses
from shareholder class action litigation make them more trouble than they
are worth.2 91 He observes a downward spiral effect-that the prospect of
payout causes the stock price to fall more than it would otherwise, which
increases the expected payout, which increases the stock's price decrease,
and so forth.
292
One of the elements required of shareholder plaintiffs that may be
difficult for the Treasury to show is reliance on the securities law violation
in deciding whether to buy or sell. According to Karmel, "[t]he reliance
requirement is frequently presumed in [Rule 10b-5] cases based on the
efficient capital market hypothesis." 293 The reliance requirement is
frequently treated synonymously with a requirement of transaction
causation. 294 Basic v. Levinson adopted the fraud-on-the-market theory to
permit a presumption of reliance, on the theory that efficient markets
would incorporate all publicly available information into changes in price,
and price is a central element in the decision of whether or not to buy a
289 Richard A. Booth, Taking Certification Seriously-Why There Is No Such Thing as an
Adequate Representative in a Securities Fraud Class Action 2 (Villanova Univ. Sch. of Law, Public
Policy Research Papers, Paper No. 2008-07, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1026768.
290 Id.
291 Id. at 3.
292 Id.
293 Roberta S. Karmel, When Should Investor Reliance Be Presumed in Securities Class
Actions?, 63 Bus. LAW. 25, 26 (2007).
294 Id. at 33.
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security.295 The fraud-on-the-market theory does not require the complete
establishment of reliance, but rather serves as a presumption which can be
rebutted by showing that the plaintiff would have purchased the securities
even if the truth were known. 296 This may make it difficult for the Treasury
to join in actions alleging misstatements in TARP participants' financial
statements that hid bad news, since it is likely that the Treasury purchased
shares precisely because they were decreasing in value and would have
done so sooner if bad news were released earlier. The Treasury may not
face this issue, however, if it sues on the basis of sales prior to the release
of good news. Fannie Mae ran into some difficulty with allegations of
earnings management-that it smoothed earnings to hide good results.
29 7
If banks engage in a similar strategy, the Treasury may be able to join in
those actions after it sells its TARP shares.
In addition, Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo holds that plaintiffs must
also establish loss causation in addition to transaction causation. 298 Loss
causation relates to proof of economic harm, whereas transaction
causation requires proof that the violation caused the plaintiff to engage in
the transaction in question. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank and
Stoneridge v. Scientific-Atlanta both also leave open some potential for the
Treasury Department to sue non-primary actors beyond the TARP
recipients in which the federal government is invested as primary
actors.299
VII. Proposed Solutions
This Article will now close with three recommendations that would
begin to remedy the problems it has discussed.
295 Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
296 In re Kmart Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 95-CS-75584-DT, 1996 WL 924811, at *1 n.9 (E.D.
Mich. Dec. 16, 1996) (citing Basic, 485 U.S. at 248 n.27); see also 2 HAZEN, supra note 221, §
12.10, at 504.
297 Jonathan D. Glater, Freddie Mac Understated Its Earnings by $5 Billion, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 22, 2003, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/22/business/freddie-mac-
understated-its-earnings-by-5-billion.html?pagewanted=all.
298 Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-46 (2005).
299 See Karmel, supra note 293, at 47-48; see also Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v.
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008); Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994). Typically the exposed players include investment banks and
accountants. With respect to the investment banks, the Treasury will face a conflict as it likely
holds control positions in those banks as well. With respect to the accountants, the Treasury might
have more flexibility. Another curious consequence of the Treasury's TARP holdings involves SEC
Fair Fund distributions. The SEC can use civil monetary penalties and enforcement settlements to
establish a "Fair Fund" for the benefit of victims of securities violations. If the victim turns out to be
the Treasury Department, will the SEC be as active in seeking Fair Funds? For an example of a Fair
Fund distribution, see Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Announces Distribution of $60





A. Fiduciary Dutiesfor the Federal Government as Shareholder
Control person liability under state corporate law would be rare for
pension funds and mutual funds, since ERISA and mutual fund regulations
prohibit owning more than a certain threshold in companies, 300 but if
somehow a pension or mutual fund did own a controlling stake it would be
subject to fiduciary duties in its exercise of shareholder control. 30 1 ERISA
and the federal securities laws impose fiduciary duty responsibilities on
private pensions and mutual fund managers, respectively. 302 Further, state
codes often govern fiduciary responsibilities involving state pension funds.
CalPERS, for instance, is subject to a codified fiduciary requirement in
the California Constitution. CalPERS is subject to a requirement to act for
the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to participants and
beneficiaries, and to engage in a prudent process for making all decisions
related to the operation of the plan, including decisions related to the
plan's investments and services. 303  The prudent person standard
governs. 304 The California Constitution further provides that a California
public pension board's "duty to its participants and their beneficiaries shall
take precedence over any other duty."305 This rule, also known as the
exclusive purpose rule, has an analogous provision in ERISA which has
been interpreted to prohibit a fiduciary from "subordinating the interests
of participants and beneficiaries in their retirement income to unrelated
objectives." 30 6 The California courts have also limited authority of judicial
review over whether California retirement plans have met their fiduciary
duty obligations.
307
One of the central provisions of ERISA as interpreted by the
Department of Labor is that plans have a fiduciary duty to vote their shares
300 See Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520,
552 (1990); Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory ofAmerican Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10, 19-
20, 24 (1991).
301 See In re Cysive, Inc., S'holders Litig., 836 A.2d 531 (Del. Ch. 2003).
302 See Emily D. Johnson, The Fiduciary Duty in Mutual Fund Excessive Fee Cases: Ripe for
Reexamination, 59 DUKE L.j. 145 (2009); Benjamin J. Richardson, Do the Fiduciary Duties of Pension
Funds Hinder Socially Responsible Investment?, 22 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 145 (2007).
303 FRED REISH, BRUCE ASHTON & STEPHANIE BENNETT, REISH LUFTMAN REICHER & COHEN,
FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND OBLIGATIONS IN ADMINISTERING 457(B) PLANS UNDER CALIFORNIA LAW 1 (2006),
available at http://www.bfsg.net/knowledgecenter/Knowledge%20Center%2OPaper%20-
%20White%20PaperFiduciary%20Responsibilities.pdf.
304 Id. at 2.
305 CAL. CONST. art. XvI, § 17(b).
306 Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Fiduciary Standard Under ERISA in Considering
Economically Targeted Investments, 58 Fed. Reg. 32,607 (June 23, 1994) (codified at 29 C.F.R. §
2509.94-1(2009)).
307 Bd. of Ret. v. Santa Barbara County Grand Jury, 58 Cal. App. 4th 1185, 1193 (1997)
("Proposition 162 removed the Legislature's authority to meddle in the Board's investment
decisions and it established that the Board's primary obligation was to its members and
beneficiaries. Proposition 162 did not insulate pension boards from judicial oversight." (internal
citations omitted)).
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in the best economic interests of the plan participants, 308 defined to
exclude the interest a participant may have in minimizing downsizing by a
firm in which the retirement plan is investing.
TARP is a program intended to minimize the cost of the bailout to the
taxpayer by permitting the government to participate in the equity upside
of bailed-out banks. Thus administration of the TARP program equity is
similar in nature to the administration of a retirement plan. The Treasury
has also noted that it plans to place its common equity in Citigroup, as well
as investments in the Treasury's new CAP, into a trust set up to manage the
government's investments, with the objective of the trustees being to
protect and create value for the taxpayer as a shareholder over the term of
the Treasury's TARP holdings. 30 9 As the Author has testified before the
House Oversight Committee, the terms of that trust do not adequately
ensure fiduciary duties are met.
3 10
The Treasury's deal sheet for the Citigroup conversion indicates that
the trust in which it will hold the common equity will be subject to the
EESA that appropriated the TARP money. 31' EESA's stated objectives are
potentially conflicting. 31 2 Thus a trust subject to this statement of purpose
of the EESA will presumably be free to vote shares in favor of interests that
threaten the long-term health of the bank in which the Treasury is
invested. 31
3
A statement of fiduciary principles is of little use, however, unless the
beneficiary of those principles is able to sue its fiduciary for violations. By
contrast, the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), established to effectuate
a government bailout of the savings and loan industry, was created by
enabling legislation that significantly waived sovereign immunity. It
provided that the RTC may "sue and be sued in its corporate capacity in
308 See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. 404(a)(1) (2006);
Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Exercise of Shareholder Rights and Written Statements of
Investment Policy, Including Proxy Voting Policies or Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.08-2 (2009).
309 U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, TREASURY WHITE PAPER: THE CAPITAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM AND
ITS ROLE IN THE FINANCIAL STABILITY PLAN 3 (2009), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/reports/tg40-capwhitepaper.pdf; see also Press Release,
U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, supra note 276, at 3.
310 Verret Testimony, supra note 147.
311 See U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, SUMMARY OF MANDATORILY CONVERTIBLE PREFERRED STOCK
("CONVERTIBLE PREFERRED") TERMS 3 (2009), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/reports/tg40-captermsheet.pdf (summarizing the terms
of preferred stock issuance under the CAP).
312 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, div. A, 122 Stat.
3765 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5201) (articulating four principal purposes: "to ensure that such
authority and such facilities are used in a manner that (a) protects home values, college funds,
retirement accounts, and life savings; (b) preserves homeownership and promotes jobs and
economic growth; (c) maximizes overall returns to the taxpayers of the United States; and (d)
provides public accountability for the exercise of such authority").
313 For a more thorough examination of the incentives facing such a group of trustees,





any court of competent jurisdiction."314 Plaintiffs were also permitted to
sue the RTC in state court. 315 Therefore, it would not be without precedent
for the Treasury to establish a code of fiduciary duty which defines its




My second proposal to limit the inherent drawbacks to the Treasury
holding common equity, while also letting the taxpayer participate in the
benefits of the bailout and thereby minimizing the cost of TARP, is to issue
to the Treasury something I call frozen options. These are options to
purchase common stock that governments are not permitted to exercise,
but which subsequent purchasers in the market are permitted to exercise.
This rests on the argument noted previously that holding common equity is
not a necessary part of the bailout. 317
314 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(9)(E) (2006); see also L.E. Creel, III, Litigation Against the
Resolution Trust Corporation, in RESOLUTION TRUST CORPORATION: BANKRUPTCIES, LIQUIDATIONS,
AND SALES OF ASSETS 91 (1990). The RTC's enabling legislation further subjected the RTC to
Chapter 5 of Title S of the U.S. Code, the Administrative Procedure Act, which is the source for open
rulemaking requirements that permits the public to participate and oversee administrative
rulemaking.
315 See Jeffrey S. Rosenblum, The RTC's Quest for Exclusive Federal Court Jurisdiction
UnderFIRREA, 24 MEMPHIS ST. U. L. REv. 725, 725 (1994).
316 This would have the mutually reinforcing effect of assuring other shareholders that it
does not intend to use its power as a shareholder to take action that will result in damage to the
long-term health of TARP participants. This would (1) assist banks in raising private capital to
enhance their TCE ratios to reflect private shareholder interest in obtaining the residual profits of
a bank's loan risk and (2) increase the value of the Treasury's TARP shares, thus helping it to
minimize the cost of TARP to the taxpayer.
317 Linus Wilson and Yan Wendy Wu offer a different view for using common equity in
bank capital injections. Wilson and Wu construct a model demonstrating that purchases of
common stock are always the most efficient method for governments to induce new lending by
banks, as opposed to purchases of preferred stock, notes, or other instruments, or public-private
partnerships. They justify the use of common equity over preferred stock not by the effect that one
or the other will have on a firm's ability to obtain equity capital from the market, but by the
incentives that infusions of common equity give banks to lend compared to the incentives that a
similar injection of preferred stock offers. One of the assumptions in the model underlying Wilson
and Wu's view is that governments are unable to contract with firms directly regarding their
lending policy. Linus Wilson & Yan Wendy Wu, Common (Stock) Sense About Risk-Shifting and Bank
Bailouts, 24 FIN. MARKETS & PORTFOLIO MGMT. 3, 4 (2010). That assumption does not hold, however,
when the government holds equity control over banks, because the government will then have the
ability to use its powers as a shareholder to influence corporate policy with the same effect as
contracting over the firm's lending policy. Wilson and Wu compare the incentive effects of using
preferred stock, common equity, or direct purchases of troubled assets on banks, and finds that
each of them involves a subsidy to the bank to induce subsequent lending. Id. at 4, 47. They
conclude that common equity purchases require the lowest subsidy to induce efficient lending, on
the basis that banks voluntarily participating in a bailout are less likely to shift inefficient levels of
risk to common shareholders than to creditors. Id. at 48. Accepting the conclusion and method of
this analysis should not necessarily lead us to believe common equity is the preferable method for
a government bailout. This Article argues that despite common stock recapitalizations,
governments are pressured to use the control powers of their common stock to require inefficient
changes in corporate policy, including lending, employment practices, M&A decisions, facility
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With respect to the banking and financial sector, the federal
government, post-TARP, has three basic sources of authority. It regulates
industry lending and financial practices. It often, though not always, serves
as the lender of last resort in the event other sources of liquidity dry up.
And now, as this Article has demonstrated, it also holds an equity interest
in TARP participants. Some may argue that the first two powers permit the
government the sufficient ability that analysis of shareholder voting
powers is rendered moot, and thus a focus on shareholder equity is
unimportant.
With respect to the technical problems that accompany TARP
ownership described above, that argument is not particularly useful. The
securities laws and corporate law are built around the powers and
responsibilities of equity stockholders. Optionholders do not have the
power to sue under the Delaware Code, nor can they join in federal class
action litigation. Option holders have never been deemed control
shareholders by virtue of their option holdings. As such, getting rid of the
federal government's equity holdings would go a long way toward
undermining the factors that make the federal government a control
shareholder.
With respect to the theoretical aspects of this Article, the argument
becomes a little more interesting. It is true that the federal government
obtains substantial power through its regulatory authority and as a
liquidity provider. However, with respect to its regulatory authority,
industry also has substantial power to push back against its regulator
through the lobbying and political interaction process. But when the
government becomes both a regulator and a shareholder, the power it
holds inside the company and the power it holds from outside interact in a
cumulative way. The government can stop a company from pushing back
against new regulation through exercise of its new ability to select, directly
or indirectly, the board of directors and chief executives. It can also give
preferential regulatory treatment to the companies it does control to help
them gain market share.
On the issue of liquidity provisions, we have seen the government
demonstrate that, though generous, its flexibility as a lender of last resort
is not without limit. Further, the power that the federal government may
obtain as a lender will also depend on existing economic conditions. As the
prospect for needing a government loan in the future becomes more
closures, and the like, that will alter Wilson and Wu's analysis and lead to the conclusion that the
incentive distortions from government-held common equity are greater because of the control
element of the common equity. This will subsequently damage the value of a bank's shares,
minimizing its ability to obtain subsequent capital from private markets and increasing the odds of
subsequent need for additional bailout and government guarantee.
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remote, the power afforded to the government by its status as lender of last
resort will continue to wane.
3 18
Giving government equity upside as part of a bailout dilutes the
interest of equityholders, imposing a penalty on them for investing in a
business that needed rescue. Bank equityholders are forewarned: invest
more resources to monitor the business decisions of your investments, or
else. But there are many ways to participate in the upside of a company. If
you let the Treasury choose the method, it will inevitably reach for the one
with the most political power. Frozen options are the best way to limit
these challenges to the bailout.
C. Sales Plan
My final recommendation is that the Treasury should establish a sales
plan for its TARP frozen options, similar to the 10b5-1 sales plans that
executives file with the SEC. 319 The Treasury should adopt a similar plan
that follows the same requirements of the SEC's exemption, in spite of its
exemption from the Exchange Act.
The first requirement of the SEC's sales plan exemption is that the
written 10b5-1 plan must have been crafted before the individual creating
the plan became aware of any material non-public information. 320 This
318 That is not to say that the powers of the government as guarantor of a company's
obligations cannot result in dramatic market distortions. The market for corporate debt imposes a
certain discipline on a company's management by requiring higher interest payments if it
perceives a company's business position as overly risky. See WALLISON, supra note 25, at 1. When
the government guarantees the private institution's debt, however, this discipline is muted. The
financial institution can continue to borrow money and invest it in riskier projects without a need
to balance that against an increasing interest rate for the funds it borrows itself or a need to offer
up more collateral for the debt. This is because private markets tend to regard U.S.-backed private
debt similarly to U.S. debt itself, and investors assume that treasuries carry no risk of default. See
Peter 1. Wallison, Regulating Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Now It Gets Serious (Continued) 4 (Am.
Enter. Inst. for Pub. Policy Research, Financial Services Outlook Series, 2005), available at
http://www.aei.org/outlook/23187. Thus, U.S.-backed private debtors can continue to borrow at
interest rates effectively subsidized by the government's guarantee. This was particularly true for
Fannie and Freddie, even through the government explicitly warned that it would not guarantee
the GSEs' debt, despite eventually doing so. See WALLISON, supra note 25, at 2; Zachary A. Goldfarb,
Treasury Secretary Backs Fannie, Freddie Reshaping, WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 2010,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/03/23/AR2010032303993.html. In effect, the markets called their
bluff, and the markets ended up being right. This discipline is further distorted by the fact that the
government actually has motives to require the guaranteed institution to take risks that present
negative value propositions for the company.
319 In 2001, the SEC adopted an exception to insider trading liability to permit persons
to make trades while in possession of material non-public information, as long as the information
was not a part of the person's decision to trade. Brandon C. Parris, Rule 1Ob5-1 Plans: Staying Out of
Trouble, Bus. L. TODAY, May/June 2008, at 21.
320 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(A) (2009). The Treasury could appoint a nonpartisan
panel of experts to design its plan, and negotiate with the various TARP participants concerning
whether they will purchase the securities in advance of the date under which the Treasury has the
right to sell them. In order to ensure that the panel makes its determinations on the basis only of
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may be difficult at this point, as the Treasury and the Federal Reserve are
likely in possession of significant inside information. The second
requirement of a 10b5-1 plan is that its terms either specify in reasonable
detail the amount and price of the securities to be purchased or sold and
the dates for such purchases or sales, or provide a written formula,
algorithm, or computer program that determines the amount and price of
the securities to be purchased or sold and the dates for such purchases or
sales.32 ' The third requirement of a 10b5-1 plan is that the terms of the
10b5-1 plan do not permit the executive to exercise any subsequent
influence over how, when, or whether purchases or sales would be effected
under the plan, and also that if the terms of the 10b5-1 plan permit a third
party to exercise such subsequent influence, such third party does not do
so at a time when aware of material non-public information.
322
The Treasury should establish a clear timeline for its ownership of
bank stocks through a sunset provision issued either through legislation or
codified rule and subject to challenge if the Treasury later changes its
mind. It should also establish a clear sales plan, similar in nature to the
10b5-1 sales plans that private executives file with the SEC to prevent
allegations that they have engaged in insider trading. This will prevent
misuse of inside information by the Treasury (or the trust that holds the
assets on behalf of the Treasury, which if staffed by Treasury personnel
will also share the Treasury's immunity from insider trading rules as well
as its access to inside information about the bank it owns).
publicly available information, it should be required to disclose the information that the Treasury
and the Federal Reserve share with it and that it uses to craft the sales plan.
321 Id. § 240.10bS-1(c)(1)(i)(B)(1)-(2). This measure could be informed by the publicly
available results of the stress tests. It could even be crafted such that the algorithm delays trades
until certain measures of a company's health or profitability substantially improve, or until such
time as the formulas indicate that the government should close out its investment and liquidate its
holdings.
322 Id. § 240.10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(B)(3). This requirement would need some implementing
legislation to adequately ensure its effectiveness. Such legislation should specify a significant
penalty for the Treasury if it violates this requirement. One simple way to guarantee a penalty
would be to lift the government's immunity under section 3(c) of the Exchange Act Alternatively,
the legislation implementing this plan could specify a penalty for its violation, such as a rescission
for any affected purchaser of securities from the government, including TARP recipients
repurchasing their own securities.
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